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In this dissertation, we describe the portable, open-source distributed simulation 
framework (WINDS) targeting simulations of wireless network infrastructures that we 
have developed. We present the simulation framework which uses modular architecture 
and apply the framework to studies of mobility pattern effects, routing and intrusion 
detection mechanisms in simulations of large-scale wireless ad hoc, infrastructure, and 
totally mobile networks. The distributed simulations within the framework execute 
seamlessly and transparently to the user on a symmetric multiprocessor cluster computer 
or a network of computers with no modifications to the code or user objects. A visual 
graphical interface precisely depicts simulation object states and interactions throughout 
the simulation execution, giving the user full control over the simulation in real time. The 
network configuration is detected by the framework, and communication latency is taken 
into consideration when dynamically adjusting the simulation clock, allowing the 
simulation to run on a heterogeneous computing system. The simulation framework is 
easily extensible to multi-cluster systems and computing grids. An entire simulation 
system can be constructed in a short time, utilizing user-created and supplied simulation 
components, including mobile nodes, base stations, routing algorithms, traffic patterns 
and other objects. These objects are automatically compiled and loaded by the simulation 
system, and are available for dynamic simulation injection at runtime.  
 
 iii
Using our distributed simulation framework, we have studied modern intrusion 
detection systems (IDS) and assessed applicability of existing intrusion detection 
techniques to wireless networks. We have developed a mobile agent-based IDS targeting 
mobile wireless networks, and introduced load-balancing optimizations aimed at limited-
resource systems to improve intrusion detection performance. Packet-based monitoring 
agents of our IDS employ a CASE-based reasoner engine that performs fast lookups of 
network packets in the existing SNORT-based intrusion rule-set. Experiments were 
performed using the intrusion data from MIT Lincoln Laboratories studies, and executed 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
1.1   Overview 
 Developments in the field of computer networking in recent years have resulted in 
the availability of advanced technologies and models for researchers developing 
hardware, communication algorithms and networking protocols.  These advances gave 
rise to fundamental questions concerning the security and the viability of many 
technologies introduced.  Security concerns are particularly important when considering a 
wireless networked system. One type of wireless network in particular, the ad hoc 
wireless network, is more vulnerable to security violations and misuse than other wireless 
network topologies. It is often a difficult task to devise a routing protocol, a security sub-
system, or an application-level system based on an ad hoc wireless network. Careful 
design and simulation of such a system is necessary to establish its feasibility under 
varied operational conditions. Network simulators have long been used for this purpose, 
saving development time and validating theoretical assumptions. However, due to a wide 
diversity in wireless network technologies, generic simulators often don’t provide the 
required flexibility and range of features that are essential for wireless network 
simulation. One of the goals of this research work was to develop a network simulation 
framework that is geared towards simulation of wireless systems. We have developed an 
architecture that allows researchers to simulate a wide variety of wireless network 
topologies and view the network configuration and visualize simulation results in real-
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time. Scalability and performance played a major role in the design of our framework. 
The framework is demonstrated in distributed simulations of intrusion detection systems 
for ad hoc wireless networks, which was the driving application that necessitated the 
development of such a simulation system. 
 
 Security in wireless networks is an area of major concern and concentrated research. 
Wireless transmissions are subject to eavesdropping and signal jamming. Physical 
security of each node is important to maintain integral security of the entire network. Ad 
hoc wireless networks are totally dependent on collective participation of all nodes in 
routing of information through the network. To solve these problems, security features 
have been incorporated into modern wireless networks, such as spread spectrum 
transmission technology, strong encryption mechanisms, vulnerability analysis, and 
intrusion detection and prevention systems. Intrusion detection is one of the key 
techniques behind protecting a network against intruders. While commonly used for 
wired networks, intrusion detection systems for ad hoc wireless networks are undergoing 
research investigation. We have developed an agent-based intrusion detection system for 
wireless networks that takes into account the limited resources and dynamic nature of ad 
hoc networks to provide a lightweight, modular, low-overhead intrusion detection 
mechanism based on the mobile security agent concept. Each module represents a 
lightweight mobile agent with certain functionality, making total resource consumption 
smaller by separating the functional tasks into categories and dedicating an agent to a 
specific purpose, with the ability to add new agents to expand the functionality. Since 
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IDS systems targeting ad hoc wireless networks are still a research problem, to test 
associated algorithms in our simulations, we have utilized a case-based reasoning engine 
with SNORT rules for detecting intrusions in wireline networks as a packet-monitoring 
component of our wireless IDS system.  
 
1.2   Contributions 
This dissertation presents the study of the application of distributed system concepts 
to the simulation of wireless networks and associated algorithms. As a result of this 
research, a parallel simulation framework was developed. This framework targets large-
scale wireless network simulations running on cluster computers and cluster grids. 
Various studies have been conducted with the help of this simulation framework – 
specifically, the research into intrusion detection systems for mobile wireless networks 
and security optimization techniques targeting low-power, resource-conscious systems. 
Results of the intrusion detection systems research are also incorporated into this 
dissertation. Our accomplishments, described in detail in the following chapters of this 
dissertation, can be briefly summarized as follows: 
 
• Developed an interactive cross-platform GUI-enabled Parallel Interactive 
Network Simulation Architecture (PINS) – with its implementation specializing 
in executing various WIreless Network Distributed Simulations (WINDS).  
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• Developed an agent-based intrusion detection system, targeting ad hoc wireless 
networks with low system resources, and incorporating a new clustering strategy 
for optimal agent allocation and a load-balancing support for wireless cluster-
based packet intrusion detection.  
 
In the first part of this dissertation, we describe the parallel interactive network 
simulation architecture (PINS) for large-scale network simulations that we have 
developed. We have implemented our architecture for simulations of wireless 
networks (WINDS simulation system), demonstrating its use in simulations of 
routing protocols in ad hoc wireless networks and mobility models in totally mobile 
wireless networks, as well as its scalability by simulating a large-scale wireless ad 
hoc network of 5000 nodes on a cluster computer. The framework performance was 
compared to several widely-used distributed simulation technologies (T-Spaces, 
High Level Architecture) as applied to parallel intrusion detection simulations on a 
cluster computer. 
 
In the second part of this dissertation, we discuss the modern intrusion detection 
systems that we have studied and assess the applicability of existing IDS techniques 
to ad hoc wireless networks. We then present an intrusion detection system targeting 
ad hoc wireless networks that we have developed. In the context of this intrusion 
detection system, we have evaluated the efficiency, correctness and performance of 
our network packet-monitoring engine using network intrusion data from Lincoln 
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Labs and introduced a load-balancing mechanism for packet monitoring to further 
improve performance of our IDS system, followed by analytical verification of 
results using a queuing model. We have also evaluated hardware and software 
components for a high-performance parallel intrusion detection system 
implementation, as well as several popular network simulation packages from a 
wireless network simulation perspective. 
 
1.3   Organization of the Dissertation 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces 
technological concepts referenced in this dissertation, describing briefly origins, 
principles and recent developments in the areas of intrusion detection systems, agent 
systems, and distributed simulation systems. Chapter 3 presents the distributed network 
simulation architecture (PINS), and an implementation of a scalable, high-performance 
wireless network distributed simulation system (WINDS) executing on multiple 
processors, either a symmetric multiprocessor computer or a network of heterogeneous 
computers. Guidelines on using our simulation system are also given in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 describes a case study of using WINDS to implement a distributed simulation 
of a totally-mobile wireless network, demonstrating the process, efficiency, ease of 
design and implementation and constraints of simulating wireless network systems and 
applications. Chapter 5 presents our work on intrusion detection systems, describing the 
intrusion detection framework for ad hoc wireless networks – an agent-based architecture 
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aimed to minimize the costs of network monitoring in a dynamic environment with 
limited computational resources. Various aspects of intrusion detection are studied in this 
chapter and simulated using WINDS. Our network packet-monitoring methodology is 
presented that uses SNORT rules and XML representation of network data to detect 
network intrusions. Intrusion detection system scalability issues are discussed, together 
with practical solution and analytical verification based on queuing theory model. 
Recommendations are also given for the choice of software and hardware components for 
constructing a high-performance parallel system. Performance comparisons are made 
between PINS framework and several widely-used simulation technologies - High Level 
Architecture/RTI and TSpaces in Chapter 6, using a back-propagation neural network 
training algorithm on intrusion datasets. Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation.  
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE 
 In this chapter we introduce the technological components used in this research. A 
brief history of key technologies is presented, including the definitions and terms used 
throughout this dissertation. In the first part of this chapter, we review current work in the 
area of distributed systems, distributed simulators and supporting mechanisms. We 
proceed to review intrusion detection systems, their underlying concepts, classifications, 
working principles and current limitations. We also introduce mobile agent systems, their 
uses, performance characteristics and security issues.  
 
2.1   Distributed Simulation Systems 
Developments in parallel and distributed computing led to the creation of high-
performance distributed simulation systems. We first introduce the history of 
development of parallel and distributed systems, then describe the advances in parallel 
and distributed simulation research, and review several frameworks for parallel and 
distributed network simulations. Future research directions in the field are presented late 
in this section. 
2.1.1   History of Development of Parallel and Distributed Systems 
 All of today’s microprocessors (Pentium, MIPS) process data in parallel. The 
Pentium 4 processor can simultaneously process up to 126 instructions at different stages 
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of execution. The ideas used in modern parallel architectures were developed long before 
microprocessors existed. The origins of parallel and distributed computing are traced 
back to 1953, when IBM introduced the IBM 701 computer with parallel-access memory 
and arithmetic [36]. As processor speeds increased, researchers saw a bigger bottleneck – 
the I/O system. In the 1950’s the main peripheral device – a magnetic tape – was 1000 
times slower accessing data than a processor. In 1958, IBM developed a new computer, 
IBM 709, which incorporated 6 independent I/O processors that were capable of working 
in parallel, communicating with main processor [79]. The IBM STRETCH computer, 
developed in 1959, incorporated breakthrough research concepts [82], such as pre-
decoding, memory operand pre-fetch, out-of-order execution, speculative execution 
based upon branch prediction, branch mis-prediction recovery, and precise interrupts. 
The first instruction-pipeline computer, ATLAS, was developed at the University of 
Manchester in 1962. It featured timesharing of several concurrent computing and 
peripheral operations, multi-programming, virtual storage, paging, and fixed storage 
(ROM) [5]. Control Data Corporation developed the CDC 6600 in 1964, which supported 
10 independent functional units [64]. This machine is arguably the world’s first super-
computer. This design was followed up in 1969 with the CDC 7600, which included 
pipelining in every functional unit [65]. The concept of matrix processors was pioneered 
in ILLIAC IV in 1974, which incorporated 64 processing elements (PEs) [37]. Each PE 
had some local memory, as well as some memory shared with a neighbor PE. The main 
control unit could access the entire memory and control the 64 PEs, which were 
synchronized and would execute the same operation, but on a different set of data. The 
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CRAY-1 supercomputer [17] was introduced in 1976 and featured the first vector 
pipelined processor with vector operations, capable of performing over a hundred million 
arithmetic operations per second.  
 
 These computers laid the foundations of the principles of parallel computing and 
gave rise to four major directions of high-performance parallel and distributed computing 
technologies. One is vector-pipeline computers that feature pipeline functional units and 
vector processing of operations that work with arrays of data. An example is CRAY T90 
[68]. Massively-parallel computers with distributed memory are another category. These 
have a large number of microprocessors with local memory, interconnected by a high-
speed network, and are a highly configurable and flexible class of parallel computers. 
Examples are Intel Paragon [38], IBM SP1 [66] and CRAY T3D [16]. Shared-memory 
parallel computers form a third class. Due to physical constraints of shared memory 
access, these computers have a limited number of processors. The last class is a hybrid of 
the first three – cluster computer architecture. This approach has received the most 
attention in the past years, as a cost-effective and very scalable parallel solution.  
 
Beowulf cluster implementation has raised parallel and distributed computing to a 
new level. Beowulf cluster computers were first introduced in 1994 as a result of the 
Beowulf Project at CESDIS [8]. A Beowulf system is a collection of personal computers 
constructed from commodity-off-the-shelf hardware components interconnected with a 
local-area network and configured to operate as a single unit, a parallel computing 
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platform, using an open-source network operating system (e.g., Linux). The driving 
design philosophy of a Beowulf system is to achieve the best possible price/performance 
ratio for a given computing problem. For many problems it's possible to achieve an order 
of magnitude improvement in price/performance compared with "conventional" parallel 
supercomputer designs. Common uses of cluster computers are traditional technical 
applications such as simulations, biotechnology, petro-clusters; financial market 
modeling, data mining and stream processing; and Internet servers for audio and games. 
 
2.1.2   Principles of Parallel and Distributed Simulation Systems 
 A computer simulation or a computer model is a computer program which attempts 
to simulate an abstract model of a particular system. Computer simulations have become 
useful tools in modeling natural systems in physics, chemistry, and biology, human 
systems in economics and social science, and in the process of engineering new 
technology. Eventually, the processing power of a single computer system became 
inadequate for certain problems of global scale; and the use of super-computer wasn’t 
always an option for many researchers. With the advent of computer networks, and later 
on computing clusters, the field of parallel and distributed simulation has received 
widespread recognition.  
 
 Parallel and distributed simulation [23] is concerned with issues introduced by 
distributing the execution of a discrete event simulation program over multiple computers. 
Parallel simulation is concerned with execution on a multiprocessor computing platform 
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containing multiple CPUs communicating frequently over a high-speed interconnection 
network. Examples include parallel computers and cluster computers. Distributed 
simulation executes on a loosely-coupled system, with individual computers distributed 
geographically and connected via a wide-area network. An example of a large-scale 
distributed system is a collaboration system running over Internet 2 between several 
major universities. In both cases, the execution of a single simulation model is distributed 
over multiple computers. Subdividing a simulation model to be executed among multiple 
computers offers several benefits:  
 
• Reduced execution times for certain simulations that can be subdivided 
efficiently to run on multiple computers, with final results combined. 
• Geographic distribution of simulation components allows inclusion of data from 
multiple scattered sensors/participants, and utilizing diverse communication 
media among processors taking part in the simulation. 
• Diverse computer architectures can be integrated into a single simulation, based 
on availability and applicability. 
• Simulations can be made fault-tolerant by replicating one processor’s tasks 
among several processors.  
 
 Subdividing a simulation among several computers poses certain problems. The 
synchronization problem raises the issues of synchronizing the events occurring on 
different computers during the joint simulation execution. Early works on conservative 
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synchronization algorithms that solve this problem include work by Bryant [11] and 
Chandy and Misra [12]. Optimistic synchronization algorithms originated from the Time 
Warp algorithm [40] introduced by Jefferson in 1985. Another problem lies in efficient 
subdivision of a sequential simulation program among several computers for parallel 
execution. According to Amdahl’s law [1], the algorithm, and not the number of 









where S is the speedup of parallelized program execution, f is the fraction of non-
parallelizable operations (f=1, means a completely sequential program), and p is the 
number of processors. The law doesn’t explicitly take into account the speed of the 
interconnection network between processors. In the early days of computer networks, 
network communications were a limiting factor for distributed systems. Modern high-
speed networks achieve gigabit communication speeds, thus drastically reducing the 
inter-processor communication delay, and improving the performance of distributed 
systems. Two strategies exist in dividing simulation systems among several computers. 
One is the space-parallel approach, where a number of concurrent simulation tasks is 
spread among multiple processors, executing these tasks in parallel, and combining the 
results of execution. Another one is the time-parallel approach, where the simulation time 
axis is divided into intervals assigned to different processors for concurrent execution. In 
this approach, processors handling every-but-first time interval assume some knowledge 
on the state of the simulation at the entry point of time, and proceed with the simulation 
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execution based on this assumption. If the boundary states don’t match, certain 
adjustments may be performed. This approach, however, is less widely used, because of 
the constraints of the state-mismatch problem.  
 
2.1.3   Modern Distributed Simulation Systems and HLA 
 Academic institutions and the defense community are the driving forces behind 
parallel and distributed simulation systems, placing emphasis on reduced simulation 
execution time and interoperability of heterogeneous simulation systems. The SIMNET 
project (1983 – 1990) was the first major leap of the defense community into the realm of 
distributed simulation systems [55]. This work led to the development of Distributed 
Interactive Simulation standards that encompassed integration of multiple simulation 
systems, sensors, and live participants. The most recent development in distributed 
simulation community is called High Level Architecture (HLA) [59], driven by DARPA, 
which has become a standardized framework (IEEE 1516) for modeling and simulation 
[87]. HLA is a component-based software architecture that incorporates subsystems for 
communication and data sharing, synchronization, and time management. This 
framework facilitates distributed and multi-platform computing in simulation systems by 
providing standard integration architecture for separate and remote applications, thus 
facilitating reuse of simulation components. Each component simulation application is 
called a federate, and a simulation system composed of two or more federates is a 
federation. The Run-Time Infrastructure (RTI) is the interconnection bridge between the 
simulators. Simulation objects have to be compliant with the data definition for the 
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simulation, which is described in the Object Model Template (OMT). The data shared 
between the federates within the federation is defined by the Federation Object Model 
(FOM). The Simulation Object Model (SOM) defines the data that federates share with 
the federation. The common RTI provides the following services to the federation: 
federation management, declaration management, ownership management, object 
management, time management and data distribution management. The architecture of 
HLA is presented in the diagram below. 
 
 
          Figure 2.1. High Level Architecture Runtime Infrastructure. 
 
The High Level Architecture is merely a standard and an abstracted framework for 
distributed simulation. It is neither a modeling tool, nor a simulator. It doesn’t have 
capabilities for data display and analysis, or any sort of user interface. HLA does not 
eliminate the programming effort that is required to build a functioning simulation system. 
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The flow of simulation and its architecture, as well as providing data processing and 
meaningful presentation and interpretation of results, is still a task of the simulation 
developer. Even though HLA provides specifications for seamless integration of various 
simulation components, the efficiency of the entire simulation heavily depends on the 
implementation and operational performance of each individual simulator comprising the 
simulation.    
 
2.2   Intrusion Detection Systems 
2.2.1   Overview 
Recent advances in networking technologies, algorithms and protocols made it 
possible to think of a network of computers as an information processing unit. The 
progress made in the area of computer networking gave rise to many new technologies – 
grid computing, distributed databases, 100% fault-tolerant systems, etc. With these 
advances came fundamental questions concerning the security of such systems. It’s quite 
easy to construct a secure centralized system – providing physical security of the 
equipment, assigning simple admission procedures and authentication mechanisms, and 
providing operating system support for process level security. Making a computer 
network secure is much more difficult. Much of the equipment isn’t in secure locations, 
and most of the communication goes over insecure data links. Common techniques of 
protecting computer network involve the use of cryptography and secure protocols. 
Physical network security is addressed by isolating access to security databases and 
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network equipment, and in some cases, protecting the network media itself. (An example 
of that is to enclose network cabling in gas-pressurized pipes and to monitor the pressure 
changes within the pipe system to prevent physical access to the network medium.) Still, 
we can only guarantee complete security of a system if its security mechanisms prevent 
unauthorized access to system resources and data. However, at present, the best we can 
do is to detect such intrusions into the system, so that action can be taken to stop the 
intrusion, repair the damage, and secure the system against similar future intrusions.  
 
 The concept of intrusion detection was introduced first in 1980 [2]. An intrusion 
attempt or a threat was defined as a deliberate unauthorized attempt to access information, 
manipulate information, or render a system unreliable or unusable. Since then, several 
methodologies of intrusion detection have been devised. The next sections discuss why 
intrusion detection systems are needed, intrusion detection approaches, evaluation, and 
limitations of intrusion detection systems.  
 
2.2.2   Need for Intrusion Detection Systems 
Users of computer systems assume properties of the system such as confidentiality, 
integrity and assurance of functionality to protect sensitive information. This information 
is the target of computer system intruders, who will attempt to exploit flaws in an 
operating system as well as application programs to gain access to such information. The 
consequences of such subversions can be quite dramatic. An example is the famous 
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internet worm of 1988 [74]. There are several ways to deal with such subversions, 
however, a few observations have to be made here: 
• It is impossible in practice to build a completely secure system. One reason is that 
despite extensive software testing, bugs do occur in the code, and quite frequently 
so. An illustration of this fact is that software products carry disclaimers instead 
of warranties.  
• Cryptographic methods have problems. The user component of security is perhaps 
a more vulnerable one (lost or stolen passwords).  
• Even if protected from outside attacks, computer systems are targeted by insiders, 
and more often than expected. FBI records show that 80% of intrusions were due 
to insider attempts. One reasonable explanation is that firewalls are pretty 
effective at keeping outside intruders at bay. 
• Efficiency of system operation is inversely proportional to the level of access 
control. Many choose a more efficient system thus sacrificing security.  
 
Therefore, we should accept the fact that there will be no absolutely secure system for a 
while, and prepare for system attacks, detecting them as soon as possible and taking 




 One of the more utilized ways of detecting intrusions is by analyzing the audit data 
generated by system and application processes. An audit trail is a log of activities on a 
system that are recorded in a file as they occur. The logging process generates very large 
data files (depending on the system, log files can be hundreds of megabytes in size, e.g. 
[31]), which are difficult to analyze manually. IDS automates the task of analyzing the 
audit trail and pinpointing any suspicious activity which can be classified as a probable 
intrusion. A thorough analysis of the audit trail is important, since it allows tracing all 
activities of intruders, detecting the damage to the system, and helping reconstruct the 
damaged components. This enables us to use IDS to detect intrusions almost real-time 
from audit data, as well as analyzing the system vulnerabilities later on to prevent similar 
intrusions.  
 
The following definitions from [2] are used throughout this dissertation: 
• Risk: Accidental or unpredictable exposure of information, or violation of 
operations integrity due to the malfunction of hardware or incomplete or incorrect 
software design.  
• Vulnerability: A known or suspected flaw in the hardware or software or 
operation of a system that exposes the system to penetration or its information to 
accidental disclosure.  
• Attack: A specific formulation or execution of a plan to carry out a threat.  
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• Penetration: A successful attack - the ability to obtain unauthorized (undetected) 
access to files and programs or the control state of a computer system. 
 
2.2.3   Classification of Intrusion Detection Systems 
Intrusion detection techniques are generally classified into two categories – anomaly 
detection and misuse detection.  
 
Anomaly Detection model makes use of operational profiles, which represent 
normal system activity for each user, application or a process. During the training period, 
regular system activities are recorded and a normal system behavior profile is established. 
During system operation, any deviations from a normal profile are considered anomalous, 
and an alert is raised. According to SANS Institute’s taxonomy of anti-intrusion 
techniques [63], anomaly detection engine employs one or more of the following 
techniques:  
 
• Threshold Monitoring sets values for metrics defining acceptable behavior (e.g., 
fewer than some number of failed logins per time period). Thresholds provide a 
clear, understandable definition of unacceptable behavior and can utilize other 
facilities besides system audit logs.  
• User Work Profiling maintains individual work profiles to which the user is 
expected to adhere in the future. As the user changes his activities, his expected 
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work profile is updated. Some systems attempt the interaction of short-term 
versus long-term profiles; the former to capture recent changing work patterns, 
the latter to provide perspective over longer periods of usage.  
• Group Work Profiling assigns users to specific work groups that demonstrate a 
common work pattern and hence a common profile. A group profile is calculated 
based upon the historic activities of the entire group. Individual users in the 
group are expected to adhere to the group profile. This method can greatly 
reduce the number of profiles needing to be maintained. Also a single user is less 
able to "broaden" the profile to which they are to conform.  
• Resource Profiling monitors system-wide use of such resources as accounts, 
applications, storage media, protocols, communications ports, etc., and develops 
a historic usage profile. Continued system-wide resource usage - illustrating the 
user community's use of system resources as a whole - is expected to adhere to 
the system resources profile. Resource profiling is user-independent, potentially 
allowing detection of collaborating intruders.  
• Executable Profiling seeks to monitor executables’ use of system resources, 
especially those whose activity cannot always be traced to a particular 
originating user. Viruses, Trojan horses, worms, trapdoors, logic bombs and 
other such software attacks are addressed by profiling how system objects such 
as files and printers are normally used, not only by users, but also by other 
system subjects on the part of users. In most conventional systems, for example, 
a virus inherits all of the privileges of the user executing the infected software. 
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The software is not limited by the principle of least privilege to only those 
privileges needed to properly execute. This openness in the architecture permits 
viruses to surreptitiously change and infect totally unrelated parts of the system. 
User-independent executable profiling may also be able to detect collaborating 
intruders.  
• Static Work Profiling updates usage profiles only periodically. This prevents 
users from slowly broadening their profile by phasing in abnormal or deviant 
activities which are then considered normal and included in the user's adaptive 
profile calculation. System administrator-controlled updates allow the 
comparison of discrete user profiles to note differences between user behavior or 
changes in user behavior.  
• Adaptive Work Profiling automatically manages work profiles to reflect current 
(acceptable) activity. The work profile is continuously updated to reflect recent 
system usage. Profiling may be on users, groups, or applications. Adaptive work 
profiling may allow the system administrator to specify whether flagged activity 
is: 1) intrusive, to be acted upon; 2) not intrusive, and appropriate as a profile 
update to reflect this new work pattern, or 3) not intrusive, but to be ignored as 
an aberration whose next occurrence will again be of interest. Activity which is 
not flagged as intrusive is normally automatically fed into a profile updating 
mechanism.  
• Adaptive Rule Based Profiling differs from other profiling techniques by 
capturing the historical usage patterns of a user, group, or application in the form 
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of rules. Transactions describing current behavior are checked against the set of 
developed rules, and changes from rule-predicted behavior flagged. As opposed 
to misuse rule-based systems, no prior expert knowledge of security 
vulnerabilities of the monitored system is required. "Normal usage" rules are 
generated by the tool in its training period.  
Misuse detection essentially checks for activities that match the descriptions of 
undesired activity. This approach attempts to draft rules describing known undesired 
usage (based on past penetrations or activity which is theorized to exploit known 
weaknesses) rather than describing historical "normal" usage. Rules may be written to 
recognize a single auditable event that represents a threat to system security, or a 
sequence of events that represent a prolonged penetration scenario. The effectiveness of 
provided misuse detection rules is dependent upon how up-to-date the vulnerabilities 
database is. Misuse detection may be implemented by expert system rules, model based 
reasoning, state transition analysis systems, or neural nets, as described below: 
 
• Expert Systems may be used to code misuse signatures as if-then implication 
rules. Signature analysis focuses on defining specific descriptions and instances 
of attack-type behavior to flag. Signatures describe an attribute of an attack or 
class of attacks, and may require the recognition of sequences of events. A 
misuse information database provides a quick-and-dirty capability to address 
newly identified attacks prior to overcoming the vulnerability on the target 
system.  
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• Model Based Reasoning attempts to combine models of misuse with evidential 
reasoning to support conclusions about the occurrence of a misuse. This 
technique seeks to model intrusions at a higher level of abstraction than the audit 
records. In this technique, intrusion descriptions are first developed at a high, 
intuitive level of abstraction in terms of sequences of events that define the 
intrusion. This technique may be useful for identifying intrusions which are 
closely related, but whose audit trail patterns are different. It permits 
examination of only portions of relevant data.  
• State Transition Analysis creates a state transition model of known penetrations. 
In the Initial State the intruder has some prerequisite access to the system. The 
intruder executes a series of actions which take the target system through 
intermediate states and may eventually result in a Compromised State. The 
model specifies state variables, intruder actions, and defines the meaning of a 
compromised state. Evidence is pre-selected from the audit trail to assess the 
possibility that current system activity matches a modeled sequence of intruder 
penetration activity (i.e., described state transitions lead to a compromised state). 
The higher level representation of intrusions allows this technique to recognize 
variations of scenarios missed by lower level approaches.  
• Neural Networks offer an alternative means of maintaining a model of expected 
normal user behavior. They offer a more efficient, less complex, and better 
performing model than statistical models of system and user behavior. Neural 
network techniques may be found to be more efficient and less computationally 
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intensive than conventional rule-based systems. A lengthy, careful training phase 
is required with skilled monitoring. After the training period, the network tries to 
match actual commands with the actual user profile already present in the net. 
Any incorrectly predicted events actually measure the deviation of the user from 
the established profile. 
In reality, each approach individually doesn’t yield an optimal level of intrusion 
detection. Therefore, two or more methods of intrusion detection are usually combined, 
resulting in a hybrid intrusion detection system. 
 
2.2.4   Limitations of Existing Systems 
 Despite advances in research on intrusion detection technologies, the field of 
intrusion detection has still many problems to overcome. This section will demonstrate 
some of the limitations that certain ID technologies possess.  
 
 Starting with Anomaly Detection models, we can recall that all intrusive activities 
are assumed to be anomalous; however, in practice only a small intersection of sets of 
intrusive and anomalous activities would classify as intrusion attempts. This leads us to 
the conclusion that anomaly detection models potentially (a) flag non-intrusive 
anomalous activities as intrusive – known as a problem of false-positives, and (b) flag 
intrusive non-anomalous activities as non-intrusive, which gives rise to a problem of 
false-negatives (a potentially more dangerous problem). Another problem with statistical 
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methods is that they can be “trained” by intruders to eventually classify intrusive events 
as normal. Recalling section 2.1.2, anomaly detection models make use of thresholds – 
setting the threshold level too high or too low will result in one of the problems outlined 
above. Approximation of threshold levels can result in a high rate of false positives or a 
high rate of false negatives across a non-uniform user population. Profiling of users and 
groups is difficult due to irregularities in the user base and the set of underlying activities 
for seemingly similar users (i.e., users with similar job titles may have different work 
habits). Similarly, resource profiling requires a somewhat difficult task of correctly 
interpreting the changes in overall system usage. Rule-based profiling also introduces 
constraints in terms of the large number of rules required to be stored, which negatively 
impacts the performance and training time.  
 
 Misuse detection resembles the virus detection systems in the way known attack 
patterns are detected; however, misuse detection methodology is of little use when it 
comes to detecting unknown attacks. The expert system approach has a significant 
drawback – the expert system has to be formulated by security professionals, and 
therefore it is as strong as the person who programs it. In addition, certain rule 
interdependencies are introduced, which makes addition or deletion of new rules more 
complicated. State transition systems possess an array of problems. First, attack patterns 
can specify only a simple sequence of events. These patterns cannot describe and 
therefore detect such violations as denial of service attacks, failed logins or passive 
network listening.  
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 Other problems with intrusion detection systems involve denial of service attacks on 
the IDS itself (an intruder can disable the IDS by issuing a large number of events 
resulting in alarms up to the point where an IDS can no longer cope with its tasks), and 
inability of the IDS to process encrypted or fragmented traffic. For instance, a well-
known IDS Snort detects intrusions by matching the hexadecimal substring from the 
network packet payload with the existing intrusion database. If the intruder’s traffic was 
encrypted or somehow modified, the attack would sneak past the intrusion detection 
system. Another point to consider is that when an alert is raised by the IDS, some 
intrusion activity has been going well before that, thus preventing us from discovering the 
exact starting point of an attack. In summary, intrusion detection systems cannot be relied 
upon as the only source of defense – rather, they should be used in unison with firewalls, 
strong encryption techniques, intrusion prevention systems and manual supervision.  
 
2.2.5   Summary of Work on Intrusion Detection Systems 
In 1980, James Anderson first proposed that audit trails should be used to monitor 
threats [2]. The importance of such data had not been comprehended at that time and all 
the available system security procedures were focused on denying access to sensitive data 
from an unauthorized source. Anderson also classified intrusions into several types, and 
separated internal intruders from external ones.  
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In 1987, Dorothy Denning presented an abstract model of an Intrusion Detection 
System [21]. This paper was the first to propose the concept of intrusion detection as a 
solution to the problem of providing a sense of security in computer systems. The basic 
idea of the model is to maintain a set of profiles for subjects (any entity taking part in 
system operation – e.g., users). When an audit record is generated, the model matches it 
with the appropriate profile, checking for abnormal behavior and reporting detected 
anomalies.   
 
In 1988, the Internet worm (also known as the Morris worm) caused the Internet to 
be unavailable for about five days [74]. This incident brought the need for computer 
security into the spotlight. The same year, Teresa Lunt et al. refined the intrusion 
detection model proposed by Denning and created IDES (Intrusion Detection Expert 
System) [52]. This system was designed to detect intrusion attempts against a single host. 
An improved version was developed in 1995, called NIDES (Next-generation Intrusion 
Detection Expert System). Also in 1988, the Haystack system [72] was developed in 
order to assist Air Force Security Officers detect misuse of the mainframes used at Air 
Force Bases, and MIDAS (Multics Intrusion Detection and Alerting System) was created 
for the same reasons for the National Computer Security Center's Multics mainframe [70].  
 
In 1989, Wisdom and Sense came out from the Los Alamos National Laboratory, 
and Information Security Officer's Assistant (ISOA) from Planning Research Corporation. 
A new concept was introduced in 1990, with NSM [33] (Network Security Monitor, now 
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called Network Intrusion Detector or NID): instead of examining the audit trails of a host 
computer system, suspicious behavior was detected by passively monitoring the network 
traffic in a LAN. NSM has several perceived advantages over audit trail-monitoring ID 
systems. First, the IDS gets instantaneous access to network data. Second, the IDS is 
hidden from the intruder because it is passively listening to network traffic. Therefore, it 
cannot be shut off or its data compromised. Finally, the IDS can be used with any system, 
because it is monitoring network traffic, protocols for which are standardized. 
 
In 1991, a different idea was introduced with NADIR (Network Anomaly Detection 
and Intrusion Reporter) and DIDS (Distributed Intrusion Detection System) [73]: the 
audit data from multiple hosts were collected and aggregated in order to detect 
coordinated attacks against a set of hosts.  
 
In 1994, Mark Crosbie and Gene Spafford suggested the use of autonomous agents 
in order to improve the scalability, maintainability, efficiency and fault tolerance of IDS 
[18]. Instead of a single large IDS defending the system, they proposed an approach 
where several independent, small processes operate while cooperating in maintaining the 
system. The advantages claimed for this approach are efficiency, fault tolerance, 
resilience to degradation, extensibility and scalability. The foreseen drawbacks include 
the overhead of so many processes, long training times, and the fact that if the system is 
subverted, it becomes a security liability.  Their idea fit well with the ongoing research on 
software agents in other areas of computer science.  
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Another approach to address the scalability deficiencies in most contemporary 
intrusion detection systems was proposed in 1996, with the design and implementation of 
GrIDS [75]. This system facilitates the detection of large-scale automated or coordinated 
attacks, which may even span multiple administrative domains. In 1998, Ross Anderson 
and Abida Khattak offered an innovative approach to intrusion detection, by 
incorporating informational retrieval techniques into intrusion detection tools [3]. And as 
the research in the field continues, we see that this paradigm is proposed as an answer to 
the security requirements of other technological areas, such as mobile networks. 
 
2.3   Agent Systems 
2.3.1   Overview 
Mobile Agents are processes that migrate under their own control in a heterogeneous 
network. When an agent is transported to a new host, its state is saved and sent embedded 
with the agent, then restored at a new host, allowing the agent to continue its execution. 
Mobile agents are divided into two kinds – strong mobility and weak mobility agents, the 
former being different from the latter in that the control state is transferred along with the 
data and code of the mobile agent to each host. The two types are used for different 
applications. Strong mobility enables agents to be independent decision-making units and 
is used, for instance, for load-balancing applications, whereas weak mobility is more 
suited towards event-driven agents and the technology behind this functionality is 
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consistently supported by Java virtual machines – a platform that most of mobile agent 
systems utilize.  
 
2.3.2   Uses of Mobile Agent Systems 
 In our intrusion detection framework discussed in Chapter 5, we have chosen to rely 
on mobile agents for a number of reasons. There are certain properties that mobile agents 
possess and certain guidelines that they follow, which are useful to our system, as 
discussed below: 
• A mobile agent doesn’t have to actually move – instead it should follow certain 
guidelines to access specific resources and make intelligent decisions whether to 
access a remote resource or a local one. 
• Mobile agents add to the complexity of systems.  While having a number of 
advantages, they are not actually adding to a set of high-level operations to a 
service, but rather remotely invoke low-level operations. 
• Mobile agents reduce bandwidth usage by filtering out only the best-matching 
results and transport them across the network, rather than the entire dataset. They 
can act as a server-side filter for the data.  
• Multiple agents can be dispatched to a number of locations and concurrently 
obtain required information. This reduces total task completion time.  
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• Agents can replicate themselves and move to multiple locations from an 
optimally-selected position within the network, thus reducing latency. For 
example, instead of sending 10 mobile agents from the source workstation, one 
agent can be sent to the gateway of the home network, and then replicated on the 
gateway system to be sent to multiple networks. 
• The user can dispatch an agent and close the connection link with the network, 
while agents independently gather the required results and return to the 
originating system whenever it becomes possible.  
• Agent systems generally provide system usage statistics, which enables them to 
perform load balancing – by sending some agents off to systems with lower 
resource usage.  
Many arguments have been made against mobile agent systems. The primary reason 
for these arguments is that existing systems provide similar functionality without any 
need for modification. However, in many cases the use of mobile agent systems will 
dramatically improve system performance and reduce operational costs. The diagram 
below, for example, demonstrates the advantage of using agent systems as opposed to 























          Figure 2.2. Advantage in Bandwidth Reduction when using Mobile Agents versus Remote 
Procedure Calls. 
 
Agent systems possess a number of other advantages over traditional client-server 
and distributed systems, as discussed and illustrated in [48]. After overcoming certain 
technical challenges (e.g., performance, scalability, standardization issues), there still 
remains an issue of security – a major area of vulnerability of the early mobile agent 
systems. The issue of agent system security is addressed in the following section. 
 
2.3.3   Mobile Agent System Security 
Mobile agent systems have numerous points of potential security breaches [15]. 
Hostile mobile agents can attack hosts, threatening server resources. Agents can have 
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their data integrity and privacy jeopardized by a malicious host posing as an agent server. 
Insecure networks make attacks on mobile agents easier. Therefore, certain security 
measures must be maintained to ensure:  
• Secure communication 
• Secure agent transfer 
• Protection of host resources from malicious data 
• Protection of agent’s code and data against tampering 
• Secure control of remote agents 
• Authentication of mobile agents 
Since 1998, much work has been done in this direction. Current mobile agent systems use 
techniques discussed in [27, 81] to protect hosts against malicious agents. Agents can be 
protected by means of encryption and other techniques, discussed in [39]. Although an 
open environment such as the Internet can pose a threat to the use of mobile agents, their 
uses for private and corporate applications are increasing. Although certain advances (and 
user education efforts) must be made before the security problems are addressed 
adequately for all Internet applications, current work promises that shortly mobile-agent 




CHAPTER 3: PARALLEL INTERACTIVE NETWORK SIMULATION 
SYSTEM – ARCHITECTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION 
  
 Research in computer networks is one of the major areas of Computer Science and 
the IT industry. A lot of time and money is spent on implementing network 
infrastructures in the industry, residential and educational sectors. Often, a computer 
network under consideration is very complex, and requires careful planning, modeling 
and analysis before deployment. Networking algorithms should be rigorously tested 
under a range of operating conditions prior to implementation and standardization. 
Various network simulators have been used for these purposes. However, due to a wide 
diversity in network technologies, generic simulators often don’t provide required 
flexibility and range of features that are essential for network simulation. One of the 
goals of our research work was to develop a parallel network simulation architecture that 
is geared towards simulation of wireless systems. We have developed an architecture that 
allows researchers to simulate a wide variety of network topologies and view the actual 
network and simulation results in real-time. Unlike many other network simulation 
systems, in our simulation framework heavy emphasis is placed on intuitive user 
interface and clear presentation of simulation objects and their interactions. In this 
chapter we describe our parallel network simulator architecture, and then introduce an 
implementation of the architecture targeting wireless network simulations – WINDS 
(WIreless Network Distributed Simulation framework).   
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3.1   Existing Work on Network Simulation 
 Researchers continually work on developing new communication protocols, 
algorithms and methods for computer networks. Research papers in the network 
community propose new algorithms offering better performance, quality of service and 
other benefits. A technology of choice should be carefully evaluated before being 
adopted in practice. Primary method of such evaluation is to create a computer simulation 
of a particular topology, communication mechanism or an algorithm.  Several generic 
network simulators offer convenient, robust simulation platforms for modeling large-
scale networks. Our primary objective was to model an intrusion detection system for 
wireless ad hoc networks, which served as a driving force behind developing a parallel 
network simulation architecture, which was extended in its implementation to wireless 
network simulations. The key requirements were flexibility, extendibility and scalability, 
as our intention was to devise a simulation system capable of being extended to very 
large scale simulations, running on several processors. Several well-known general-
purpose network simulators were considered to create our simulation model of a large-
scale wireless network.  
 
 Primary choice of simulator packages was discrete-event simulators. Many existing 
event-driven simulators support inter-object communications by message passing and 
process events from the queue of events as they become available. Examples include MIT 
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Advanced Network Architecture group’s NETSIM [35], UC Berkeley’s INSANE [53], 
LBLN’s NS, based on REAL [56]. Another popular simulator is NS-2 [56] - a discrete 
event simulator that provides substantial support for simulation of TCP, routing, and 
multicast protocols over wired and wireless networks; however, the implementation 
incurs substantial memory overhead and increases the complexity of simulation code. 
Based on numerous published results, it is not easy to scale NS-2 beyond a few hundred 
simulated nodes; only recently, simulation researchers have shown it to scale, with 
substantial hardware resources and effort, to simulations of a few thousand nodes [60]. 
User-defined objects can be created in almost all of the above simulator packages; 
however, in majority of cases, only one specific language of choice (such as C) was 
available for implementing those objects, resulting in reduced portability of the 
simulation system and dependencies on a specific platform. While this may not be a 
problem for a single-computer simulation, or for a cluster computer with identical 
configuration of all nodes, a definite problem arises while deploying the simulation 
framework on a heterogeneous distributed system. Another problem with compiler-
dependent approach is the reduced target clientele.  Some simulators allow user-defined 
objects to be created and manipulated via scripts [53, 56]. A brief comparison of several 
of the above mentioned simulators is given in [13]. 
 
 One of our requirements was an intuitive user interface support, which would allow 
us to visually demonstrate the concepts behind our intrusion detection algorithms in real 
time by getting snapshots of the simulation execution. NETSIM [35], NEST [46], 
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OPNET [13] and some others provided such a GUI, while many other simulator packages 
only provide numerical results. Some of the commercially-available simulation systems, 
such as MIL3 Software’s OPNET, were also considered.  OPNET has proven to be a 
well-composed, extensible and scalable simulator package. However, lack of source code, 
minimal support for experimental wireless network configurations and licensing issues 
prevented us from using it.  
 
Intrusion detection system induces a high processing load on the simulator 
(especially for large-scale simulations). With this in mind, several parallel and distributed 
simulator packages were considered, such as CPSIM [26] and Columbia University’s 
NEST and its extension REAL [46]. NEST has many protocols built-in, implements 
client-server model for distributed simulation and provides a design-time GUI for 
creating network topologies. NS-2 also can be extended to multi-processor systems using 
Akaroa-2 - a tool for running quantitative stochastic discrete-event simulations on UNIX 
multiprocessor systems or networks of heterogeneous UNIX workstations by creating 
multiple instances of an ordinary simulation program and running them simultaneously 
on different processors [57]. However, for our purposes, a specialized simulation 
framework for large-scale wireless network simulations is desired, as it provides basic 
out-of-the-box support for mobile wireless networks, including wireless routing, mobility 
support, and other specific features. For high-performance simulation, a tightly-coupled 
parallel system is required to minimize impact of slow network inter-processor 
communications. This necessitates two important requirements – the simulation 
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framework should target wireless networks, and should be efficiently implemented to 
execute on parallel architectures.  
 
 We have considered several simulators targeting wireless networks. SWiMNet [10] 
is a scalable framework developed for parallel simulation of wireless and mobile PCS 
networks; it eliminates most of the event dependencies by having a pre-computation stage 
before feeding events into the simulator, which can reduce the number of rollbacks in its 
parallel execution, but poses additional constraints on the simulation. WiPPET 
framework deals with issues of evaluating wireless propagation and various wireless 
communication protocols [44], and doesn’t provide the level of abstraction in its object 
model that we require.  An extended version of WiPPET, TeD, is a C++ implementation 
of a parallel wireless simulation framework that supports built-in wireless protocols such 
as GSM, TDMA and AMPS [43]. In [51], a conversion from sequential to a parallel 
wireless network simulator is presented, with considerable reduction in simulation 
execution time for time-consuming complex scheme simulations. Another popular 
wireless network simulator GloMoSim [25] targets simulations at multiple layers, 
concentrating on physical layer modeling. In terms of scalability these wireless 
simulators are limited, as the following figure demonstrates, comparing NS-2 and 
GloMoSim’99 for parallel simulations [77]:   
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The review of the network simulators mentioned above concludes that: 
• Modeling of wireless nodes is not flexible enough to include desired functionality 
(i.e., mobility models for ad hoc networks) in the case of generic network 
simulators 
• Extensive software development effort is required to implement commonly 
occurring features of the simulation 
• Few simulators allow working with external data files (e.g., TCP trace files in 
binary format) 
• Source code is sometimes not available to extend the design and functionality of 
the simulator 
• Most simulators are relying on C/C++ libraries compiled for a particular 
architecture, thus making it non-portable between different computer systems 
• Learning curve is usually steep even for simple simulations 
 
 Our simulation architecture was developed as a research tool to provide time-saving 
flexible simulation test-bed targeting a wide range of network architectures. The  
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implementation of this architecture – a parallel interactive simulation framework – is a 
cross-platform, interactive, portable, GUI-driven and can be used as a scalable parallel 
wireless network simulator for a variety of purposes, such as routing in ad hoc networks, 
mobility models of totally mobile wireless networks [7, 19], sensor networks, Bluetooth 
Pico-nets, etc.  
 
 In this chapter, we first present the simulator architecture design. Framework 
modules are described in detail in the next section, as well as a generic simulation process. 
We also list requirements and limitations of our simulation framework. Then, its design is 
extended to the parallel and distributed simulation environment, and simulation 
performance is established. Key design issues are also described in detail in this chapter. 
 
3.2   Network Simulator Architecture 
3.2.1   Design Philosophy 
 The objectives of this research and development project were to reduce redundant 
software design efforts in the area of network simulation, establish a framework general 
enough to be used for simulations of many network technologies, and provide for 
common base for the exchange of models relating to any network infrastructure. The 
object-oriented nature of the software and the use of a popular programming language 
(Java) for implementation allow researchers to easily modify, reuse and share whole 
systems or system components. Our framework also includes customizable user interface 
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that can be easily adapted to a specific problem. Very intuitive design and layout of the 
graphical environment allow the system to be used for demonstrational or educational 
purposes. GUI can be executed separately from the simulation engine and function as a 
visual demonstration of an algorithm or a system. Our goals were: 
• Clean, easy-to-understand and modify design 
• Object-oriented approach 
• General portability 
• Use of a popular programming language 
• Easy-to-use, GUI-driven framework 
• Performance comparable to other distributed technologies 
• Scalability 
 
Following these guidelines, we have developed PINS architecture – a flexible, portable, 
network simulation framework that can be used to simulate a variety of applications for 
optical, wireless and wireline networks. We have implemented PINS architecture on a 
symmetric multiprocessor cluster computer to address the issues of scalability with large-
scale simulations; results are discussed in the next section.  
 
 The design of our simulation framework is based on a building-block approach. 
Researcher implements an algorithm or a prototype from modules that receive inputs in 
the form of events, process them, and then generate outputs (events, log entries, GUI 
updates). The entire network is built from objects – network nodes, event generator, and 
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communication channels. Connections between network nodes are maintained by the 
connections module incorporated into the routing protocol object. Any network 
infrastructure is supported and can be configured - Ethernet, burst-switched optical, ad 
hoc wireless and hybrid (e.g., totally-mobile) wireless networks. Object-oriented 
approach is central to the generality and flexibility of the system and allows users of our 
framework to reuse, share and catalog simulation components by modifying or replacing 
appropriate classes.  
 
 Computer networks are particularly convenient to be modeled via object-oriented 
approach because they typically consist of discrete components, easily thought-of as 
interactive objects (for instance, network nodes, protocol stacks, packets) that interact 
with each other by message passing. By changing a particular module, simulations can be 
modified in a short time. As source code is provided, functionality of simulation event 
generator can be modified to accommodate new networking paradigms. Users can create 
shared libraries of swappable modules that describe their system for an easy experiment 
replication.  
 
 Popular network simulators aim at supporting every aspect of network 
communications, such as, for example, every layer of many communication protocols or 
every communication subsystem [25, 77]. This adds tremendous overhead to the 
simulation system, often resulting in scalability problems and slow execution times. Our 
simulation framework avoids these problems, by implementing only the core 
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functionality of a network – supporting simulation clock, network communication, 
routing and network object mobility (for wireless applications). These functions are 
highly-abstracted, allowing the user to include specific communication protocols, routing 
algorithms and other required simulation parameters, as necessary. Another goal of our 
framework development was to integrate user interaction with simulation execution as 
closely as possible. Therefore, our simulation system choice was a time-stepped 
simulation system, as opposed to majority of discrete-event wireless simulation systems. 
The rationale behind this choice is the fact that in a network simulation with large 
network traffic, there is no particular advantage of running as-fast-as-possible simulation, 
jumping to the next event right away; however the issue of communication 
synchronization is complicated, when developing a parallel simulation system. The 
intuitive graphical user interface of our framework therefore reflects any changes in the 
simulation execution as they happen, in scaled real-time, allowing the user to adjust the 
simulation parameters at run-time. Another advantage or our framework is ability to use 
almost any data file as a source of network communications. Data file pre-processor 
converts binary packet data into the format used by our simulation framework, translating 
simulated network address space into plain addressing scheme used with our simulation 
framework. As an example, intrusion data from the Lincoln Laboratories IDS tests was 
used to test our wireless IDS system simulation.   
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3.2.2   Simulator Components 
 Our simulator architecture consists of four key modules, each comprised of a 
number of components, as described below: 
• GUI (graphical user interface) 
• Simulator Core Module 
• Network Traffic Module 
• Data Logging Module 
 
 The diagram below (Figure 3.1) shows the architecture of our framework. Some of 
the modules carry optional functionality and can be included into the simulation as 
necessary. The functionality of each module is described further on in this section. 
Architecture Use Case UML diagrams for the User and the System actors are presented in 
figure 3.2 (a) and 3.2 (b). Basic simulation flow is shown in figure 3.5. 
 
Graphical User Interface Module 
The graphical user interface (GUI) module shows the simulation execution in real-time 
(figure 3.1). The GUI class is tied up to the simulation engine clock, and displays the 
required information every clock cycle. GUI class shows the simulation area with 
wireless node objects moving and communicating. Certain simulation settings can be 
adjusted via GUI module, such as network communication parameters and simulation 
clock interval. GUI module also provides controls for simulation execution – user can 
pause simulation, step through the simulation one clock cycle at a time, add and remove 
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simulation objects. The GUI interface is generic enough to accommodate various network 
entities, but can be modified to reflect specifics of a wireless architecture being studied. 
 
  Our simulation framework provides a flexible user interface component – for 
instance, you can use it to supply specific parameters used in simulations of ad hoc or 
infrastructure wireless networks, using the same interface. GUI module also records 

























Figure 3.1. PINS Component Architecture. 
 







of simulation and saves the results in CSV format, which can be later processed by a 















Figure 3.2(a). PINS User Use Cases. 
 
Simulator Core Module 
 Simulation Engine: The heart of the PINS framework is a Simulation Engine. One of 
the design requirements is that PINS is a scaled-real-time time-stepped system. The 
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simulation is tied up to a graphical user interface, allowing users to monitor simulation 
progress in real-time and modify simulation parameters on the fly. This would not be 
otherwise possible with a discrete-event simulation system. The simulation engine runs 
an internal clock, the speed cycle of which can be controlled by the researcher at run-time. 
Programmatically implemented as a high-priority thread, the simulation engine runs in a 
loop continuously, driving execution of all other components of the simulation. Any 
events happening at a certain time must be processed by simulation objects at once, 
within a single simulation cycle. The simulation engine is common to all simulation 
models, and cannot be modified by the user. Simulation engine class keeps track of object 
definitions of all user-defined objects taking part in a simulation (such as wireless nodes, 
routing algorithm used, mobile base stations and stationary routers), and instantiates them 
at runtime. 
PINS System
Initialize Simulation Load User Objects Update Object Properties Process Inter-Object 
Communication
Update GUI Load Simulation Data Synchronize Object Activities Output Statistics
 
Figure 3.2(b). PINS System Use Cases. 
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 Simulation Objects: The simulation objects execute independently and are time-
synchronized via the simulation engine clock. Our framework has a few pre-defined 
simulation objects. One such object type is a wireless node object. Wireless nodes are 
members of any wireless network simulation, and can be either stationary or mobile. A 
smooth random-destination no-wait mobility pattern is embedded by default in a wireless 
node object. User can modify the motion pattern by implementing a different mobility 
algorithm (or read waypoints from a data file). This allows simulations to be flexible and 
account for many possible node mobility patterns. Each network node object also 
includes two methods used for inter-object communication – Send and Receive methods. 
Send method is invoked when a node is transmitting packets, and has a source, 
destination, protocol, port and payload as its arguments. When applied to wireless 
networks, Send method determines all the neighbors of the current wireless node, and 
broadcasts the packet to its neighbors by invoking Receive method on each neighbor 
node. Receive method first checks the packet destination, then depending on the routing 
algorithm used, forwards the packet to the destination or simply drops the packet. This 
allows the user to simulate ad hoc and infrastructure wireless networks.  
 
 Routing protocol is another simulation object. The routing protocol included with 
our framework is a simple table-driven protocol, which is implemented programmatically 
as a separate routing class. To modify the routing protocol, user must include all 
necessary parameters in a network node object, and implement their own routing protocol 
class. Since the simulation framework serves communications in exact same way as a 
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real-life communication network, all existing routing protocols are supported. Depending 
on the system configuration in question, framework user can also instantiate a Base 
Station object, as used in the simulations of wireless infrastructure and totally-mobile 
wireless networks. The base station object supports Send and Receive methods (as 
described above), and is supplied with center-of-gravity motion pattern, which is used in 
the totally-mobile wireless network simulation. When base station object is used, the 
routing algorithm class must also be updated to route all network packets via appropriate 
base station.  
 
Network Traffic Module 
 Network traffic for our framework is generated by the Network Packet Processor. 
The implementation of this object is common to all the simulations and includes reading 
a pre-processed data file in XML format, and forwarding each packet to the appropriate 
Figure 3.3. Sample Network Packet Capture. 
network node (source). Pre-processing is performed on a binary data file obtained from 
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network packet capturing software (such as TCPDUMP). A sample capture of network 
packets is shown in figure 3.3 and a decoded packet example is shown in figure 3.4. Here, 
a network trace file is obtained and converted for the use in our simulation framework by 
substituting IP address space by a simulation network object address space. Each packet 
is decoded, and a new packet is created after processing addressing information. Further 
pre-processing may be done by stripping payload off the packets, adding data to the 
packets (and updating packet header), filtering packets for specific features (e.g., a 
timestamp, or a particular protocol).  
Figure 3.4. Decoded Packet Information. 
 
Our simulator uses a flat addressing scheme to reduce communication overhead, and 
therefore all network addresses are converted to compatible notation by the BIN/XML 
Parser module offline. Packet processor object generates packets at times specified by 
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timestamps of each packet processed, and makes use of simulation engine’s internal 
clock to time distribution of the packets. This allows us to speed up simulation execution, 
limiting the simulation speed only by the hardware specifications and the maximum 
packet broadcast rate. Simulation can automatically be stopped when the end of the data 
file is reached.  
 
Data Logging Module 
saves the simulation results for future analysis. During simulation 
 
.2.3   Requirements and Limitations of Simulation Framework 
ework, and a few 
 Data logger class 
execution, results are stored in memory and displayed in a human-readable form via GUI 
data display window for performance reasons (frequent disk I/O operations reflects 
negatively on simulation performance). The representation of results can be tailored to 
particulate simulation requirements and is defined in the GUI class. Data parser: At the 
end of the simulation run, these results are first pre-processed by a data parser to format 
data suitable for import into the mathematical analysis software. CSV file generator: The 
pre-processed output is saved as a CSV file (a commonly used comma-separated data file 
format) by the CSV file generator.   
 
3
 Certain limitations exist in our single-processor simulation fram
guidelines have to be strictly adhered to. Knowledge of Java programming language is 
required for developing user simulation objects, as well as clear understanding of 
principles of wireless communications. Object-oriented nature of our framework requires 
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all designs to comply with ideology of object-oriented programming and class definitions 
used in the simulation framework. The framework design imposes minimal hardware 
requirements. This, however, entails a restriction on the size of simulation supported. The 
number of wireless nodes is limited in framework specification, but can be changed to a 
higher value, if hardware of the computer used to run the framework is powerful enough 
– as the next section shows, where we have implemented the PINS architecture as a 
parallel simulation framework executing on multiple processors to address the issues of 
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Figure 3.5. PINS Simulation Execution Activity Diagram. 
 
 The design  making use of 
configuration files, where a user can specify required parameters, such as wireless 
simulations; however it is out of scope of the framework design for now. Graphical user 
client machine running the simulation. A Java compiler compliant with Sun’s version 1.3 
of the framework may be further improved by
communication range, initial number of nodes, etc. Optimally, a scripting support is 
beneficial to any simulation system, thus simplifying design and control of user 
interface communicates directly with the simulation engine and displays progress of the 
simulation derived from data supplied by the simulation execution via the main simulator 
class. This requires all simulations to be structured around the simulator class, and not 
directly with user modules. Finally, a Java run-time environment has to be installed on a 
or greater is also required if a simulation incorporates user-defined simulation objects that 
need to be compiled.  
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3.3   Wireless Network Distributed Simulation System 
 In this section we extend the framework architecture to simulations of wireless 
networks in multiprocessor environments and describe the optimizations to further 
improve the performance of the simulation system for large-scale simulations of wireless 
networks. We call our distributed simulation framework WINDS – WIreless Network 
Distributed Simulation framework.  
 
3.3.1   WINDS Design for Cluster Computer 
 The single-processor version of the simulation system suffices for small-scale 
simulations of wireless networks. However, we have had significant reduction in 
performance when performing simulations in excess of 200 wireless nodes. Scalability is 
an important factor of every simulation system, as computer networks grow in size and 
become more complex in functionality. A distributed simulation is the answer to 
scalability problems. The concepts of a distributed simulation have been presented in 
Chapter 2. As for the practical implementation, first, the entire set of objects in the 
simulation is partitioned into several parts. For instance, we can divide 100 simulation 
objects evenly between 5 processors, assigning objects to processors in a round-robin 
fashion. As user interface provides capability to instantiate multiple user objects of the 
same type with one command, multiple types of objects are instantiated sequentially, 
resulting in a balanced allocation of simulation objects of all types between the 
processors.  During simulation execution, each of the processors performs computations 
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relevant to objects assigned to it. As most of our single-processor simulations have 
exhibited computationally-intensive properties user objects versus smaller amount of 
inter-object communications, distributing simulation objects among multiple processors 
promised good scalability results. Communication between objects is handled by the 
communication broker – if two objects are handled by the same processor, 
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Figure 3.6. WINDS Architecture for Distributed Wireless Network Simulations  
in Multiprocessor Environments. 
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more) objects are assigned to different processors, inter-processor communication takes 
place. Our WINDS architecture [28] is presented in figure 3.6.  
 
The simulation procedure is as follows. After object definitions have been devised 
and placed in a shared object directory, user starts the simulation framework on a master 
processor node. This in turn remotely starts simulation clients on each of the processors. 
Initially, user adds new objects to the simulation via graphical user interface. The objects 
are associated with processors in a round-robin manner. Instructions are sent to a 
respective processor from the master processor node to create an instance of an object 
and load it in memory. Object template is then read from disk by that processor, and a 
new object instance is created in its memory space. From now on, this object is handled 
by a local simulation control module on that processor. Once all objects have been 
created, simulation execution commences. Simulation engine sends a clock pulse out to 
every processor, and all communication between objects is clock-synchronized. 
Simulation broker located on the master processor keeps track of locating a specific 
object and serves as a routing module for the cluster communications. Other modules 
(like data logging module) behave in the same way as described for the single-processor 
version of WINDS. When a packet needs to be sent from one object to another in the 
course of the simulation, communication broker on the node containing source object 
first determines if both objects reside on that node. If this is the case, then communication 
is performed locally by invoking the Receive method on destination object (same as for 
the uni-processor case). If the destination object resides on a different processor, first a 
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proper destination network address of that processor is determined by consulting 
simulation broker on a master processor node. Then, a network communication is 
initiated between the local processor, and the destination processor, handled by 
communication brokers of both processors. When a message is received on the 
destination processor, it is parsed for parameters, and Receive method of the destination 
object is called. Apart from exchanging messages between objects, all the processors also 
communicate with the master processor once every few clock cycles to ensure consistent 
state of the simulation and to report on the state of each object taking part in a simulation 
(i.e., to update the GUI information for each object). Commands are also sent 
synchronously from the master processor to each client processor to control simulation 
execution. The screenshots of the simulation system are shown in figures 3.7(a), (b). The 
base class diagram for the WINDS framework shown in the figure 3.7(c) illustrates the 
main Java classes of the framework and their associations.  
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Figure 3.7(a). Processor window showing object allocation among processors.
 
Figure 3.7(a) shows (on a local host example with multiple aliases) the list of all 
processors taking part in the simulation, and the associated user objects. Each processor 
executes a processor agent that relays all console messages to the master node’s simulator 
GUI screen. These messages may then be viewed by the user in regular or verbose mode, 
allowing him/her to obtain detailed account of simulation activities on each processor. 
This screen allows the user to simultaneously instantiate simulation agents on an entire 
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range of processors (e.g., all the nodes of a cluster computer) by specifying a range of IP 
addresses and a command for each processor. For example, setting IP range of 
10.0.0.101-121 will result in instantiating simulation agents on all specified nodes. User 
can also look up IP address by machine’s name, and specify an agent invocation 
command and optionally, user’s password. An example of such a command on a Linux 
cluster computer would be: rsh –n # | tcsh | cd ~/WINDS | java parsimc &.  
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Figure 3.7(c). WINDS framework core class diagram. 
 60
Figure 3.7(b) demonstrates totally-mobile wireless network simulation in progress. Panel 
on the upper right shows all available user classes and instantiated objects for each class. 
Lower right panel provides means to instantiate user objects from class templates. Main 
window shows graphical presentation of simulation execution, with user object 
interactions in real time.  Figure 3.8 shows a simulation of a wireless ad hoc network’s 
mobility models for a large number of wireless nodes. 
 




Here, 700 user objects are distributed among 3 processors – two on a local LAN, and a 
third one on the cluster computer, separated from the local LAN by a residential high-
speed cable line. Simulation clock delay is set at 125 ms, which is possible despite 
substantial inter-processor communication latency of this geographically-distributed 
simulation, due to internal clock cycle advance on each processor and clock-
synchronization mechanism discussed in the following section. 
 
3.3.2   Simulation Clock Synchronization 
The WINDS architecture was initially deployed on a Scerola cluster computer [67] 
with 128 900 MHz AMD Athlon processors. Each cluster node has dedicated memory 
space of 256 MB, and can access data concurrently from a replicated disk subsystem (15 
GB each). Inter-processor communication is conducted via Fast Ethernet switch at 100 
Mbps. More recently, our Distributed Systems Lab has acquired a new Ariel cluster 
computer [4] with 32 dual-processor 2.6GHz P4 nodes, each having a 2GB memory and 
40GB hard drive space, and interconnected via Gigabit Ethernet. We have seen 
significant simulation execution time improvements over the previous cluster computer, 
as shown, for instance, in chapter 5. Initially, the simulation framework was relying on 
time synchronization mechanism of a distributed operating system running a cluster 
computer. However, for long-running simulations, the local clock discrepancy between 
multiple nodes of a cluster was too large. In an extended time period, physical clocks on 
these nodes would differ by 400ms or more between clock synchronizations.  
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Our simulation framework utilizes a distributed time synchronization algorithm 
supplemented by a centralized push time service from the master node. As with all time 
synchronization algorithms, there is an issue of measuring and predicting network delays 
affecting transmitted time-sync messages. Initially simulation clocks are synchronized via 
a centralized algorithm based on Network Time Protocol (NTP) [23].  A message is sent 
from the master processor to each simulation node, and returned. Four time stamps are 







T3 T1+δ T2=T1+δ+L 
T4=T3-δ+L’ T3-δ 
 
Figure 3.9. Determining offset and network delay in NTP. 
 
Master processor (PM) sends a time-sync message at local time T1 to the simulation 
agent’s processor (Pi) that at that moment has a local time of T1 + δ, where δ is the offset 
between two clocks (and is unique for each agent processor taking part in the simulation). 
The message is received by the agent processor at a time T2 = T1 + δ + L, where L is the 
network latency to send a message from PM to Pi. After processing the message, Pi returns 
it back to PM at time T3, with the assumed PM’s clock equal T3 - δ. The final timestamp is 
the PM’s clock value of T4, which equals T3-δ+L’, where L’ is the message latency from 
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+= δδ , 
which is the midpoint offset between the wall clocks of PM and Pi.  
 
During simulation execution, each processor independently increments simulation 
time based on the wall clock time advance, and sends its current simulation clock to the 
master processor at a certain frequency. If a master processor doesn’t receive a clock 
value from a particular processor within pre-defined time interval (equal to max (L, L’)), 
the network delay increase is assumed, and that processor’s clock value is discarded from 
synchronization step. The maximum clock value is then selected from all processors’ 
simulation clock values, and is broadcast to all processors using a synchronous delay 
update command. To ensure simultaneous execution of simulation commands on all 
nodes of the cluster, the built-in simulation command synchronization mechanism has the 
following steps: 
 
• Master processor (PM) gets simulation time TS 
• PM sends TS + ∆T to P1…N, where ∆T is the derived maximum inter-processor 
communication delay: ∆T = max (δe,1, δe,2, …, δe,N).  
• Each processor sleeps until local simulation clock hits TS + ∆T 
• Simulation command is executed on each processor simultaneously 
• Each processor periodically sends internal current clock cycle  to PM 
• PM sends out current clock cycle to those processors that lag behind for clock 
cycle update via dedicated TCP connections used for simulation control. 
 64
The following sequence diagram (3.10) demonstrates the time synchronization 
procedure used by the WINDS framework. 
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Figure 3.10. Command synchronization in WINDS – sequence diagram. 
 
3.3.3   Parallel Optimizations 
 One of the main drawbacks of distributed implementation of many network 
simulators is inefficient inter-processor communication. In the case of a network of 
computers taking part in a simulation, network delay can be a significant obstacle to the 
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goal of improving performance and scalability through the distributed simulation. Other 
traffic exists on the network, affecting simulator communications. Unless network nodes 
are dedicated to the simulation purpose, node stability is an issue that can disrupt 
simulation entirely in the event of a single node crashing during the simulation run. Only 
certain computation-intensive algorithms can benefit from distributing the simulation 
among multiple processors. We have considered these and other issues when developing 
distributed WINDS framework. The optimal choice of computer hardware was 
computing cluster, where all processors communicate via high-speed switched network 
connections but own independent memory space and an instance of an operating system. 
This allows us to simulate very large wireless networks of diverse configurations.  
 
 Still, concerns exist for certain scenarios where inter-processor communication 
delay is of an issue. This can happen when one object repetitively communicated with 
objects located on a different processor, or in the event of a large number of broadcast 
communications taking place. Therefore, we have considered a number of optimizations 
that target the problems associated with the distributed simulation system. In one such 
optimization, during a certain period of time, all communication patterns are recorded, 
and allocation of objects is then optimized. For example, if object A communicated with 
object B much more frequently than other objects, and these two objects are located on 
different processors, then one object is serialized and migrates via the network to the 
processor managing another object, where it is then restored in memory. In many cases, 
especially when object functionality is sparse, the size of the object is small, justifying 
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such a migration. In another optimization, all communications between objects are 
concatenated together and sent as a single network packet between a pair of processors 
once every few clock cycles, and then locally time-synchronized.  
 
Table 3.1. Simulation control parameters for a cluster-based WINDS. 
 
Process / Setting Value 
Master-to-Processor simulation command propagation time < 10 ms 
Synchronous command broadcast to all processors (any number) < 500 ms 
Time to instantiate simulation object on remote processor (from template) < 20 ms 
Time to send object across network (via serialization) < 40 ms 
Typical simulation synchronization delay 1000 ms 
Typical simulation clock cycle 50 ms 
Time-scaled simulation multiplier (variable, dependent on architecture) 20x 
Time to update GUI < 100 ms 
 
Table 3.1 lists the procedural performance numbers and typical simulation settings for the 
WINDS framework running on a cluster computer. 
 
 To minimize the overhead of exchanging large number of packets with small 
payload, we utilize the advantage of Nagle algorithm. Nagle algorithm is used to 
automatically concatenate a number of small buffer messages; this process (called 
nagling) increases the efficiency of a network application system by decreasing the 
number of packets that must be sent. For instance, a single byte of data originating from 
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one simulator component could result in the transmission of a 41 byte packet consisting 
of one byte of useful information and 40 bytes of header data. This translates into a large 
communication overhead. Nagle's algorithm instructs the sender to buffer data if any 
unacknowledged data is outstanding. Any data sent subsequently is held until the 
outstanding data is acknowledged (ACKed) or until there is a full packet's worth of data 
to send. Our simulation framework accumulates packets generated by each processor into 
a queue, which is then sent at once, before the simulation clock cycle advances (e.g., 
every 100 ms). Since the estimated time to send a certain-sized packed is known in 
advance, when the queue reaches an established threshold size, the packet is generated 
and sent out. As amount of inter-processor communications increases, two or more 
packets could be sent out before the expiration of the current clock cycle. Once the packet 
arrives to the destination processor, the events from the queue are individually analyzed 
and inserted in the Event Handler’s queue in an appropriate location based on a time 
stamp supplied. This mechanism facilitates elimination of out-of-order delivery of 
simulation packets and events embedded in these packets. For simulation control 
connections (e.g., simulation clock dissemination), nagling is disabled for all control 
sockets by specifying TCP_NODELAY option. Figure 3.11 shows an example of how 
nagling affects simulation control, when creating new user objects on multiple processors.  
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Figure 3.11. Effect of nagling on simulation control.  
3.3.4   Serialization of Simulation Objects and Load Balancing 
Originally, the Round-robin mechanism of simulation object distribution is used to 
allocate user simulation objects to the processors within the cluster. It does not provide 
the optimal assignment of nodes to processors, resulting in substantial inter-object 
communication overhead. We have studied the effects of various ways to distribute and 
organize simulation object hierarchies. The final layout of the simulation framework is 
still a client-server model, with a server residing on one cluster node, providing 
centralized time management and network routing for the simulation framework. Most 
heavy processing of data is still performed on individual processors, and the bottleneck 
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effect of the central node is negligible, when taking into considerations the high load of 
each individual processor. To reduce network traffic, we have implemented a 
serialization scheme to allow user objects to migrate from one node to the other 
throughout the simulation execution. The central node monitors the network traffic to 
detect user objects that produce frequent inter-node network communication. The 
simulation operator then has an option to move a particular user object across the network 
from one processor to the other, to minimize amount of inter-object communications. 
 In the case of a network with low node mobility, initial object assignment to 
processors may be optimized by deciding on the number of processors supporting the 
simulation and specifying each nodes’ coordinates in accordance with the current node’s 
expected processor assignment. For instance, if we utilize 4 processors (P1, P2, P3 and P4) 
in our simulation, we can geographically split the simulation area into 4 parts (A, B, C 
and D). Then, given the low mobility of user objects, we can minimize the inter-
processor communication during simulation execution by instantiating, for example, 
every object 1, 5, 9, … with initial coordinates placing it in region A,  objects 2, 6, 10, … 
placed in region B, etc. The Round-robin object allocation mechanism will then 
instantiate all objects in region A at processor P1, all objects in region B at P2, etc.  
 
 The object serialization is implemented via BOB (Better Object Binder) XML 
serialization library. An object is serialized at one processor, then is sent by the 
simulation communication broker to another processor, where it is de-serialized, using 
the following code:  
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// Serializing an object into XML representation: 
new org.lucci.bob.DataBinder.XML().serialize(obj, outStream); 
  
// Deserializing an object on another processor: 
Object obj = new org.lucci.bob.DataBinder.XML().deserialize(inStream); 
 
 
Listing 3.1. Serializing and De-serializing User Object. 
 
Using BOB library allows the user to save object state in XML format and visually 
examine it if necessary. The library doesn’t require implementing serializable interface in 
user objects, this making it less complicated for the user to create simulation objects.  
  
To study the benefits of object serialization and its effects on load-balancing 
network traffic in distributed simulations, we will consider an algorithm from section 5.4 
– load balancing packet distribution for the purpose of monitoring by an intrusion 
detection system. While the algorithm is described in detail in chapter 5, the main idea is 
to partition the wireless ad hoc network into clusters, then allocate the main control node 
(cluster head) to collect network packets. The packets are then split into batches and 
forwarded to other members of the same cluster for processing. If the wireless nodes are 
located on the same processor and have a property of low mobility, simulation network 
bandwidth can be saved by relocating simulation objects within a cluster onto the same 
processor. From table 3.1 and experimental results, the average time to send a batch of 
packets for processing to another user object located on a different processor is 5 ms. The 
operation of serializing an object and sending it across the network is 40 ms.  The 
distributed intrusion detection algorithm achieves best performance (in terms of quality 
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of intrusion detection) when many helper nodes are used (see figure 5.8). As the number 
of nodes within a cluster is 5 on average, we can directly benefit by moving cluster 
members to the same processor. For the experiment, a simulation was created with a 
fixed number of nodes, and executed on a variable number of processors. Each graph in 
figure 3.12 shows results for low (uniformly distributed, with a maximum of < 0.1% of 
diagonal size of simulation area per second), and high (uniformly distributed, with a 
maximum of < 1% of diagonal size of simulation area per second) mobility of nodes. If 
two simulation nodes are located on the same processor, the time to forward a batch of 
packets (average size 10 packets per batch) between the nodes is assumed to be 0. All 
nodes are instantiated with a geographic distribution that initially allocates neighboring 
nodes to the same processor (as described at the beginning of this section), minimizing 
serialization efforts at the beginning of the simulation. Number of nodes is fixed to be 
200 throughout the simulation. Network traffic is Poisson-distributed, with min and max 
rates of 8 and 92 packets per second, respectively. From the graph, we see that in case of 
low node mobility, serialization process significantly reduces the amount of traffic 
between the processors, compared to regular simulation execution. However, in the 
scenario where the simulation objects are highly mobile, the object serialization 
mechanism yields an increase in the inter-processor network traffic. We can infer from 
these results that a careful analysis of simulation execution is required, prior to utilizing 
object serialization mechanism.  
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Figure 3.12. Using simulation object serialization for distributed DID problem. 
 
 
3.4   Summary 
In this chapter we have described the PINS architecture for parallel interactive network 
simulations. General framework design is presented, and can be used as a platform of 
extending the architecture to specific network simulation applications. The framework is 
cross-platform, scalable, and easily adjustable to particular simulation requirements. A 
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specific implementation of PINS for simulating large-scale wireless networks, called 
WINDS – is also presented. WINDS framework has been used in our research on the 
agent-based ad hoc network intrusion detection system, and later – as a research and 
development tool that incorporates a flexible test-bed targeting simulations for a wide 
variety of wireless network applications. WINDS is a generic wireless network simulator 
for a variety of wireless communication infrastructures, such as wireless networks, 
cellular networks, ad hoc networks, sensor networks, etc. We demonstrate the use of 
WINDS for several specific applications, such as an intrusion detection system 
simulation in wireless ad hoc networks. We have extended WINDS implementation to 
the multiprocessor environments for a transparent execution on a symmetric 
multiprocessor cluster computer, and a network of LAN-interconnected computers, and 
utilized inter-processor clock synchronization algorithms and object serialization 
mechanism, resulting in a substantially-increased scalability and performance of large 
wireless network simulations.  
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CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDY – WINDS SIMULATION 
This chapter describes the process of designing and executing a simulation on our 
distributed simulation system, giving studies of efficiency and constraints of simulating 
wireless network systems and applications. A particular wireless infrastructure, called a 
totally-mobile wireless network, is presented in this study. Step-by-step simulation 
development process is presented, together with study objectives, simulation procedure, 
and interpretation of results.  
 
4.1   Simulation of MBS Mobility in a Totally-Mobile Wireless Network 
 The concept of a totally-mobile wireless network was developed at the University of 
Central Florida [7]. It represents a crossover between infrastructure wireless and ad hoc 
networks – an infrastructure, where the transmitting base stations are mobile – mounted 
on mobile platforms and can be moved to a specific location to optimize wireless 
coverage offered. This scenario is of interest to the groups utilizing in-the-field 
communications, and similar entities requiring high level of fault-tolerance and 





Figure 4.1. Totally-mobile wireless network concept. 
 
Several fault-tolerant designs have been considered, and various experiments were 
conducted to decide on the framework that provides high level of redundancy, yet is 
economically efficient [7]. The architecture was devised, where active mobile base 
stations would be supplemented by auxiliary base stations positioned in the vicinity of the 
respective base station. If an active base station ceases to function, all wireless 
connections are switched to the auxiliary base station that will re-position itself to 
optimize wireless coverage and preserve communication links of existing clients. 
Furthermore, umbrella coverage is provided by a mobile base station with a larger area of 
wireless coverage. The base station providing this coverage will frequently re-position 
itself to accommodate wireless clients outside the scope of coverage by the smaller base 
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stations. Multiple positioning algorithms have been devised to optimize the coverage area 
of the entire wireless network under study. Some are based on signal strength; others 
assume the knowledge of mobile node positions, where a global positioning system 
(GPS) provides precise user coordinates to the base station, allowing it to make 
calculated decisions on its own positioning. For the purpose of this simulation, we will 
consider Center-of-Gravity algorithm for positioning mobile base stations in this section 
and compare it with the average-case scenario of a uniformly-distributed group of 
communicating nodes.  
 
4.1.1   Objectives 
• To simulate the mobile base station center-of-gravity positioning algorithm for 
optimal wireless coverage for the totally-mobile wireless network model. 
• To compare the mobile MBS coverage with the stationary base station scenario, 
in the case of uniform density of mobile node distribution. 
 
4.1.2   Simulation Design 
The simulation pre-conditions are as follows: 
1. Wireless node mobility is governed by Random Waypoint mobility pattern with 
zero waypoint wait time. 
2. Mobile base station mobility is governed by Center-of-Gravity motion vector 
mobility pattern. 
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3. The ratio of each MBS signal area coverage to the total simulation area is 1:12. 
4. The ratio of umbrella MBS signal area coverage to the total simulation area is 1:6. 
5. Number of mobile base stations is varied from 1 to 8 for the same simulation area.  
6. Channel capacity of each MBS is assumed unlimited. 
7. Network density (number of nodes per unit area) is varied from 10 to 100, and the 
average coverage data is computed at the end of simulation.  
 
The simulation proceeds according to the following scenario: 
1. Wireless nodes are created and communication parameters initialized.  
2. Mobile base stations (MBS) and an Umbrella base station (UBS) are created. 
3. Each wireless node is assigned to a MBS, and the rest of mobile nodes within the 
coverage area of UBS are assigned to the UBS.  
4. Each wireless node is mobile throughout the simulation.  
5. Each node broadcasts its position to all MBS in vicinity.  
6. Each node has an ownership index, indicating which MBS it is covered by.  
7. Each MBS and a UBS is mobile throughout the simulation. 
8. Each MBS is assigned to a group of nodes – but services all other wireless nodes 
within its vicinity up to capacity. 
9. Each MBS moves towards the center-of-gravity of the assigned group of nodes, 
computing its position based on the coordinates of each wireless node within a 
group. 
10. A UBS moves towards the center-of-gravity of the unassigned group of nodes. 
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11. Network density (number of nodes per unit area) is varied from 10 to 100. 
12. Number of MBS is varied 1 to 8, and results are recorded for each setting. 
13. Simulation executes for 10 minutes (wall time) at each setting of MBS number. 
14. Simulation clock is set to 100ms (10x faster-than-real time execution). 
15. Simulation stops after the final run has been completed, at the number of MBS of 
8. 
 
The only communications in the simulation are the messages from mobile nodes with 
their positioning information sent to MBSs, and the ownership update messages sent 
from MBSs to wireless nodes. The results are compared with the average-case scenario 
(not described in this section, but is a separate simulation), where wireless nodes are 
moving randomly, and the base stations have fixed positions and are uniformly 











Table 4.1. Simulation objects for ad hoc wireless network clustering simulation. 
 
Object Properties 
1. Wireless node 
(wNode) 
1. Mobility: Random Waypoint algorithm 
2. Send(): send packet method 
3. Receive(): receive packet method 
4. myMBS: integer – associated MBS index; 0 if not associated 
5. myPos: XY – current node coordinates 
6. cntAssociated: long integer – total number of sampled times, 
when a node was covered by MBS (samples taken every 10 
simulation clock cycles) 
7. cntDisAssociated: total number of sampled times, when a node 
was not covered by MBS (samples taken every 10 simulation 
clock cycles) 





1. Mobility: Center-of-Gravity motion vector algorithm 
2. CommRange: integer – MBS’s communication range in 
simulation distance units (e.g., meters) 
3. Send(): send packet method 
4. Receive(): receive packet method 
5. ComputeToVector(): compute motion vector method 
6. coveredNodes[]: XY-array – set of all covered wireless nodes 
and their positions 
7. myPos: XY – current MBS coordinates 
8. toPos: XY – calculated motion vector 
 
The following figure 4.2 shows an activity diagram of a Wireless Node object activities 


























Figure 4.2. Wireless node in a totally-mobile network activity diagram. 
 
In figure 4.2, when a node receives a packet, the source of the packet is always a MBS. 
Due to the absence of network communication other than for the purpose of MBS 
assignment, the node parses the incoming packet and gets assigned to a new MBS, 
sending back the node’s current position.  
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Figure 4.3. MBS in a totally-mobile network activity diagram. 
 
Simulation framework traffic routing module determines what wireless nodes are within 
communication range, based on user-supplied CommRange property of the MBS.  
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The wireless node and mobile base station objects are implemented as Java classes 
following the WINDS object design template, and have the structure (in pseudo code) 
depicted in the following listings.  
// Wireless Node class 
// Object parameters and default parameter values: 
 
//#P str DefaultObjectNamePrefix, int initXPos, int initYPos, bool 
isMobile 
 
//#D wNode, 0, 0, true  
 
 
public class wnode { 
 
  int ID; 
 
  String objName; 
 
  simEvtHandler ParentClass; 
 
// Mobility study parameters 
 
  int cntAssociated = 0; 
 
  int cntDisAssociated = 0; 
 
  int myMBS = 0; 
 





  wnode() // Wireless node object constructor - initialization 
 
  void Tick() // Simulation clock pulse – every 10th clock tick here,  
     // update the cntAssociated and cndDisAssociated 
 
  void Receive(Long simClock, String dataType, String strPayload)  
 
  void Send(Long simClock, String dataType, String strPayload) 
 






Listing 4.1. Wireless node in a totally-mobile network Class. 
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// Mobile Base Station class 
// Object parameters and default parameter values: 
 
//#P str DefaultObjectNamePrefix, int initXPos, int initYPos, bool 
isMobile, bool isUBS, int myID 
 
//#D mStation, 0, 0, true, false, 1  
 
 
public class mStation { 
 
  int ID; 
 
  String objName; 
 
  simEvtHandler ParentClass; 
 
// Mobility study parameters 
 
  int myID = param(myID); 
 
  XY myPos = param(initXPos, initYPos); 
 
  XY toPos; 
 




  mStation() // Mobile base station object constructor - initialization 
 
  void Tick() // Simulation clock pulse – calls mbsMove 
 
  void Receive(Long simClock, String dataType, String strPayload)  
 
  void Send(Long simClock, String dataType, String strPayload) 
 
  void mbsMove() // Mobile base station center-of-gravity mobility 
 
  XY ComputeToVector() // Computes new MBS motion vector based on 





Listing 4.2. Mobile base station in a totally-mobile network Class. 
 
 84
4.1.3   Simulation Execution and Results 
The wNode and mStation classes were placed in the simulation root/objects directory, 
then dynamically loaded by the simulation framework. The simulation results are sent to 
the central Simulation Statistics window of the user interface, and are saved into a CSV 




Figure 4.4. Totally-mobile network simulation in progress. 
 
Wireless nodes are numbered and connections between the nodes and the base stations 
denote communication links within range. Blue nodes indicate that a node has been 
assigned to the mobile base station, cyan – a node is assigned to an umbrella base station 
and gray – node is not connected to the wireless network. Mobile base stations are 
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labeled as MBn, and a motion vector computed according to center-of-gravity algorithm 




























Figure 4.5. Network coverage of wireless nodes in a totally-mobile network simulation. 
 
Figure 4.5 demonstrates that applying center-of-gravity positioning policy to mobile base 
stations yields worse-than-expected network coverage results, in addition to the base 
station repositioning requirement (an average of results at various network density levels 
is presented here). However, as we increase the density of the wireless network, as well 
as the number of mobile routers supporting the network, the overall network coverage is 
improved. The results demonstrate that a simple center-of-gravity algorithm for 
positioning mobile routers is far not the best possible solution. It can, however, be used in 
cases where wireless clients move in closely-congregated groups. Such a use would be of 
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primary interest to the military communications, tours where mobile clients are used for 
guidance and informational purposes, and sensor networks. 
 
4.2   Summary 
In this chapter we have demonstrated the use of WINDS distributed simulation 
framework for a specific scenario of parallel-simulating a totally-mobile wireless network, 
and specifically a mobility pattern study for such an infrastructure. This chapter may 
serve as a template for designing parallel wireless simulations, including simulation 
objectives, pre-conditions, design of the simulation execution, a choice of statistics, and 
interpretation of results. The entire process from simulation design to execution and 
result analysis is very concise, due to hierarchical object-oriented nature of the simulation 
framework and the high interactivity and flexibility of the user interface. Another study is 
presented in chapter 5, in the context of a wireless network intrusion detection system. In 
the following chapter we describe our work on an IDS framework for wireless ad hoc 




CHAPTER 5: INTRUSION DETECTION FOR WIRELESS AD HOC 
NETWORKS  
  
 Ad hoc wireless networks are a widely utilized type of wireless networks today. 
More than any other network topology, they are vulnerable to intrusions, as they operate 
in an open medium and use cooperative strategies for network management and 
communications. In this chapter we summarize our current research on a distributed 
intrusion detection framework for ad hoc wireless networks based on mobile agent 
technology. Intrusion detection processing is minimized using a real-time clustering 
algorithm and various load balancing strategies, while maintaining high degree of 
intrusion detection accuracy. A case-based reasoning approach to our network-level 
intrusion detection engine incorporates sophisticated artificial intelligence techniques that 
help overcome some of the limitations of other rule-based intrusion detection systems.  In 
contrast to many intrusion detection systems designed for wired networks, we develop an 
efficient and bandwidth-conscious framework that targets intrusions at multiple levels 
and takes into account distributed nature of ad hoc wireless network management and 




5.1   Rule-Based Intrusion Detection 
 With rapid development of wireless network applications, security became one of 
the major problems that wireless networks face today [62]. While firewalls may prove to 
be an efficient first line of defense in wired networks, this is certainly not the case in the 
wireless world. Wireless transmissions are subject to eavesdropping and signal jamming. 
Physical security of each node is important to maintain integral security of the entire 
network. Ad hoc wireless networks are totally dependent on collective participation of all 
nodes in routing of information through the network. These are some of the major 
problems that wireless networks face today. As the uses of such networks grow, users 
will demand secure yet efficient, low-latency communications.  
 
 Intrusion detection is one of key techniques behind protecting a network against 
intruders. Existing intrusion detection systems and techniques have been reviewed in 
chapter 2. In this chapter, we will concentrate our presentation on ad hoc wireless 
networks. Ad hoc wireless network is a collection of mobile nodes that establish a 
communication protocol dynamically. The nodes may join the network at any time and 
communicate with entire network via the neighboring nodes. There are no base stations, 
and each member of such a network is responsible for accurate routing of information, 
and takes part in routing decisions. Due to arbitrary physical configuration of an ad hoc 
network, there is no central decision making mechanism of any kind – rather, the network 
employs distributed mechanisms of coordination and management. What really makes a 
difference between fixed wired and mobile wireless networks is the fact that mobile 
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nodes have a very limited bandwidth and battery power. Network packet monitoring is 
performed at gateways in a fixed network, but a concept of a gateway in a wireless 
network is very vague, depending on the type of network and routing algorithms used. 
Efficient host-based monitoring requires large amounts of CPU processing power, and 
hence is energy consuming.  
 
 Our work on intrusion detection system for ad hoc wireless networks takes into 
account the above considerations to provide a lightweight, low-overhead mechanism 
based on mobile security agent concept, described in chapter 2. Agents are dynamically 
updateable, lightweight, have task-specific functionality and can be viewed as 
components of a flexible and dynamically configurable IDS. These qualities make them a 
choice for security framework in bandwidth and computation-sensitive wireless ad hoc 
networks. We utilize mobile agents at several intrusion-monitoring levels and process 
their response in cluster heads – special nodes that are dynamically elected within a 
cluster using a real-time distributed algorithm. One advantage of our approach is the 
efficient distribution of mobile agents with specific IDS tasks according to their 
functionality across a wireless ad hoc network. The other advantage is restriction of 
computation-intensive analysis of overall network security state to a few key nodes. 
These nodes are dynamically elected, and overall network security is not entirely 
dependent on any particular node. We also propose a load-balancing solution that 
efficiently distributes traffic monitoring and intrusion detection tasks among the wireless 
nodes, improving the accuracy of intrusion detection system without sacrificing the 
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overall performance of a wireless network and functionality of each node participating in 
the network. At the network-monitoring level, we have developed a case-based approach 
to network intrusion detection (discussed in the next section), and incorporated case-
based reasoning engine for detecting intrusions at the packet level in our modular IDS 
system. 
 
5.1.1   Case-Based Reasoning Systems 
 Case-based reasoning systems are designed for a given application domain. It is 
possible to abstract out the common aspects of CBR from the domain specific aspects 
[69]. This leads to a generic case-based reasoner from which any arbitrary domain-
specific case-based reasoner can be created as a specific instance. In order to build the 
desired generic case-based reasoner, it is required to generalize both the notion of a case 
and the notion of a similarity metric used for determining the degree of similarity 
between cases. Since cases are described by their features, the first task is to describe the 
generic notion of a case feature. The framework proposed in [69] makes it possible to 
define virtually any type of feature and any type of case. The similarity metric for cases 
can be defined as a collection of feature comparison results with a rule specifying how 
these intermediate results are combined. Moreover, feature comparisons can be 
generalized into the generic notion of feature comparator of which each specific 
comparator is an instance. Although each case feature may require a different type of 
comparison, the result of the comparison should be a similarity assessment between the 
same case feature of the problem specification and of a case from the case archive. 
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Therefore for each new type of case feature, it is required to define a comparator that 
determines the degree of similarity between the problem situation feature and the 
corresponding feature in the case archive. Since different case features may use the same 
comparator, the number of comparators in the system will be much smaller than the 
number of different features. The modular distinction between comparators and case 
features simplifies the adaptation of the system into different problem domains. 
Report Formulate Search Results Problem/ Archives 5 Attack 2 
 
 The basic features of a general case-based reasoning (CBR) system are depicted in 
figure 5.1. The most important component of the system is the case archive where the 
previously experienced problems are stored with their solutions. Each entry in the case 
archive is called a “case” which contains (i) the features describing the problem, and (ii) 
the action or actions that were taken to solve the problem. When a problem is detected in 
the surrounding environment, it is formulated as a set of case features (step 1). Then, this 
Case Archive
















Problem / attack 
generated response
results
Figure 5.1. Case-based Reasoning Process. 
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problem description is transferred to a search engine that extracts the similar cases from 
the case archive, where similarity is measured by the similarity between the matching 
features of the problem description and the case features of actual cases in the case 
archive (step 2). The returned cases are ranked according to their degrees of similarity to 
the given problem. At this moment two different scenarios are possible: either some of 
the selected cases are decided as a solution to the problem or a new case is formulated to 
solve the problem based on the returned cases. In either case, the actions recommended 
by the returned case or cases are taken (step 4). Furthermore, the measure of success or 
failure of the result of the action is reported along with the case into the case archive (step 
5). This information is taken into account in the similar-case extraction process so that 
the performance of the system improves over time. 
 
 
5.2   Network Intrusion Detection System for MANETs 
 This section introduces our multi-sensor intrusion detection system employing 
cooperative detection algorithm. A mobile agent implementation is chosen, to support 
such features of the IDS system as mobility of sensors, intelligent routing of intrusion 
data throughout the network and lightweight implementation.  
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5.2.1   Modular IDS Architecture 
 The proposed Intrusion Detection System (IDS) [41] is built on a mobile agent 
framework. It is a non-monolithic system and employs several agent types that perform 
specific functions, such as: 
• Network monitoring: Only certain nodes will have sensor agents for network 
packet monitoring, since we are interested in preserving total computational power 
and battery power of mobile hosts. Network monitoring agents feature misuse 
detection engine (described in the following section). 
• Host monitoring: Every node on the mobile ad hoc network will be monitored 
internally by a host-monitoring agent. This includes monitoring system-level and 
application-level activities for anomalies.  
• Decision-making: Every node will decide on the intrusion threat level on a host-
level basis. Certain nodes will collect intrusion information and make collective 
decisions about network-level intrusions. 
• Action: Every node will have an action module that is responsible for resolving 
intrusion situation on a host (such as locking-out a node, killing a process, etc). 
 
 Each module represents a lightweight mobile agent with certain functionality, 
making a total network load smaller by separating the functional tasks into categories and 
dedicating an agent to a specific purpose. This way, the workload of a proposed IDS 
system is distributed among the nodes to minimize the power consumption and IDS-
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related processing time by all nodes. A hierarchy of agents has been devised in order to 
achieve the above goals. Hierarchical IDS systems have been proposed in [20, 9, 34]. 
However, we will adapt our own hierarchy for our purposes. There are three major agent 
classes – monitoring, decision-making and action agents. Some are present on all mobile 
hosts, while others are distributed to only a select group of nodes, as discussed further. 
Monitoring agent class consists of packet, user, and system monitoring agents. The 




Packet-Level  User-Level  System-Level  
Figure 5.2. Layered Mobile Agent Architecture. 
 
5.2.2   Mobile Agent Distribution across Wireless Ad Hoc Network 
 As mentioned above, not all the nodes on a wireless ad-hoc network will host all 
types of IDS agents. To save the resources, some of the functionality must be distributed 
efficiently to a (small) number of nodes while providing an adequate degree of intrusion 
detection. While all the nodes accommodate host-based monitoring sensors of an IDS, we 
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use a distributed algorithm to assign only a few nodes to host sensors that monitor 
network packets, and agents that make decisions.  
 
The idea is to logically divide a mobile network into clusters (similar to Clustered 
Gateway Switch Routing protocol described in [61, 14, 58] and used in [80] for 
authentication purposes) with a single cluster head for each cluster, and to monitor the 
packets within the cluster by only one node. The algorithm is presented below, along with 
an example.  
 
Clustered Network-Monitoring Node Selection Algorithm: 
1. Hop Selection Step: based on security requirements, a certain number is selected as 
a number of hops. This step is important in choosing decision agent-hosting nodes, 
as well as network monitoring nodes, as selected number is the maximum number of 
hops from any node in the ad-hoc network to the Decision Node. Selection of this 
number greatly affects the network monitoring range, as only those nodes taking 
part in a decision process host network monitoring agents, resulting in lesser area of 
the network being monitored.  
2. Let Ci denote the number of established connections (reachable nodes) for node i at 
the time of cluster setup, with a total of N nodes in the entire network. Each node 
sends its Ci value to all its reachable neighbors. 
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3. Upon receiving Cj values from its neighbors j, where j ≠ i for all i = 1…N, a node i 
sums up the total as Si (connectivity index), which upon completion is broadcast to 
all nodes with a time to live (TTL) equal the number of hops selected in step (1): 
∑+=
j
jii CCS  
4. Each node then has to vote to select cluster head node, that will accommodate 
network monitoring and decision agents. Every node sends a vote packet to the node 
it selects based on highest connectivity index received as a result of a broadcast in 
step (3). If a node receives a vote from a node with equal Si value, it doesn’t send a 
vote to the source node. In case two nodes have equal Si values and send votes to 
each other simultaneously, the node with the largest total of Si values sends a 
“discard vote” message to the other node. This will ensure that the minimal number 
of nodes is selected for hosting packet-monitoring agents. Note that in step 3, a node 
will decrease TTL count and broadcast the packet containing Si to all its reachable 
neighbors, resulting in every node receiving the information about the maximum Si 
within the hop distance.  
5. Each node that received at least one vote loads and runs Network Monitoring and 
Decision Agents.  Steps (4) and (5) are shown on a diagram 5.3, giving scenarios for 




























Figure 5.3. Network monitoring node selection with (a) one-hop radius, and (b) two-hop radius. Dashed lines 
indicate a vote packet route. Nodes selected to host network monitoring and decision agents are highlighted. 
 
 
The selected nodes host network-monitoring sensors that collect all packets within 
communication range, and analyze them for known patterns of attacks. Parameters such 
as per-protocol statistics, number and frequency of certain packet types and consistency 
with the model are verified. The main advantage of the allocation algorithm above is that 
overall packet-monitoring task is limited to a small subset of nodes, thus conserving 
power and processing capabilities for many nodes in the ad hoc network. In contrast, in a 
monolithic IDS system where each node hosts packet-monitoring module, a message sent 
from node B to node A will be received and checked by node C as well as node A, thus 
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 introducing redundant processing action. This is visually demonstrated in the figure 5.4. 
As the physical network arrangement changes, cluster membership is dynamically 
updated. Figure 5.5 shows a percentage of nodes engaged in network-monitoring 
activities vs. the total number of the nodes. 
 
 
Cluster Head node 




Wireless Cluster 1 
C E C-to-B 
C-to-B 
Cluster Head 1 C is not cluster 1 
member, hence 
discard packet 
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Wireless communication (packet sent) 
Figure 5.4. Wireless Ad Hoc Network Communications. 
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Figure 5.5. Percentage of nodes engaged in packet monitoring in a one-hop 
(dashed line) and two-hop (solid line) network. 
 
5.2.3   IDS Activity Monitoring Process 
 As shown in Figure 5.2, monitoring agents are categorized into packet monitoring 
sensors, user activity sensors and system-level sensors. While packet monitoring is 
activated only when a node participates in the network (is a member of a cluster), local 
activity sensors are present on each node and are active all the time. Each sensor 
performs certain level of monitoring activity and reports anomalies to the decision agents.  
 
Packet-monitoring agents reside on each selected node. In the Figure 5.3 above, we can 
see that for a case of one-hop cluster, 5 nodes out of a total of 11 nodes host network 
monitoring sensors, resulting in the entire network being monitored. For instance, a 
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packet sent from node A to node B will be received and analyzed by the monitoring node 
to the left of node A. In fact, for a case of one-hop cluster, every node has at least one 
neighboring node hosting a packet monitoring agent, and thus the entire network is 
always being monitored. If the system resources are scarce and security requirements can 
be relaxed, a two-hop system will be more appropriate, as indicated in Figure 5.3(b). 
Here, we have only 3 hosts dedicated to packet monitoring and decision-making process, 
saving overall system resources. However, in this scenario, 3 links are not being 
monitored, which may be acceptable for a highly-dynamic environment, where network 
configuration changes often. The rationale is that a node is located in close proximity 
(within two hops) to the packet-monitoring node, and rapid movement may position the 
node within a communication range of that packet-monitoring node.  
 
 Each cluster head monitors packets sent by every member of its cluster, and 
therefore, the agent subsystem has a low-level access to the underlying operating 
system’s network layer to capture packets that are not intended for the cluster head node. 
We limit the collection of packets only to those that have as originator any node that 
belongs to the cluster. This is done to prevent processing of the same packet more than 
once by any packet-monitoring agent. When packets are captured, they are inserted in a 
queue (logically), and physically added to a buffer of fixed size (the size depends on the 
node’s available memory and processing capabilities). The packets are then dequeued and 
processed by the agent’s case-based reasoning engine (CBR) for intrusion detection. The 
mechanism of a CBR engine is described in section 5.1.1. If a packet queue of a cluster 
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head node becomes full, further packets are dropped until space is available in the queue 
(see Figure 5.6). By varying queue size, we limit processing done by a cluster head node, 
as its resources are also used for performing regular user tasks with minimal latency for 
the user. Agent subsystem is also configured to limit CPU usage by an agent to a certain 
level, acceptable by the user. To improve the quality of intrusion detection process, a 
distributed algorithm is applied to prevent large number of packets from being dropped 
even in traffic-intensive environments. The algorithm is discussed in section 5.4, and is 
shown to provide a scalable solution to packet-monitoring process with graceful 






















Figure 5.6. Increase in packet dropping rate as the network density increases. 
 
 Local detection agents are located on each node of an ad-hoc network, and act as 
user-level and system-level anomaly-based monitoring sensors. These agents look for 
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suspicious activities on the host node, such as unusual process memory allocations, CPU 
activity, I/O activity, user operations (invalid login attempts with a certain pattern, super-
user actions, etc). If an anomaly is detected with strong evidence, a local detection agent 
will terminate suspicious process or lock out a user and initiate re-issue of security keys 
for the entire network. If some inconclusive anomalous activity is detected on a host node 
by a monitoring agent, the node is reported to the decision agent of the same cluster that 
the suspicious node is a member of. If more-conclusive evidence is gathered about this 
node from any source (including packet monitoring results from a network-monitoring 
agent), the action is undertaken by the agent on that node, as described above. This 
functionality of our IDS system is currently undergoing active research. A few known 
approaches have been evaluated for suitability of application to wireless ad hoc networks, 
and a profile-based anomaly-detection system is being considered for deployment within 
the host monitoring agents. 
 
5.3   Simulation of a Wireless Ad Hoc Network Clustering Algorithm 
 This section describes implementation of the distributed simulation of a large-scale 
wireless ad hoc network in support of the wireless clustering algorithm and packet 
monitoring for intrusion detection study, described above.  
5.3.1   Objectives 
• To compare the efficiency of our hierarchical ad hoc wireless network clustering 
algorithm [29] with a non-hierarchical scheme, where every wireless node 
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receives and processes a packet sent by any of its neighbors through an intrusion 
detection system’s packet-monitoring module. 
• To utilize a Case-based reasoner [30, 69] agent in the IDS packet-monitoring 
module at each node taking part in the simulation, and process each packet being 
transmitted, resulting in a realistic IDS scenario. 
• To utilize MIT Lincoln Lab intrusion datasets [32] as a source of packets.  
5.3.2   Simulation Design 
The simulation pre-conditions are as follows: 
1. Node mobility is governed by Random Waypoint mobility pattern with zero 
waypoint wait time. 
2. For each node taking part in packet-monitoring task, the buffer storing incoming 
packets has a fixed length.  
3. Network traffic is generated from the pre-processed database of packets, 
originally obtained from MIT Lincoln Laboratory IDS studies [32] and containing 
known intrusions.  
4. Simulation area is fixed, and the network density (number of nodes per unit area) 
is varied from 10 to 100, resulting in elevations of network traffic rates.  
 
The simulation proceeds according to the following scenario: 
1. Ad hoc wireless nodes are created and communication parameters initialized.  
2. Each wireless node participates in a clustering scheme via broadcast of control 
packets.  
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3. Each wireless node sends and receives packets and is mobile throughout the 
simulation.  
4. Network density (number of nodes per unit area) is varied from 10 to 100. 
5. Simulation executes for 10 minutes (wall clock) at each setting of network density. 
6. Simulation clock is set to 250ms (4x faster-than-real time execution). 
7. Each node taking part in packet-monitoring task records the number of total 
packets and the number of IDS-processed packets for every change in network 
density.  
8. Total number of received and IDS-processed packets is recorded for each setting 
of network density.  
9. Simulation stops after the final run has been completed, network density=100. 
 
The network traffic used for this simulation comes from a processed Lincoln Labs 
intrusion dataset. As our WINDS simulation framework uses internal flat address scheme, 
all internal subnet addresses are mapped to existing nodes (e.g., N1, N2, etc.), while all 
external traffic from the dataset is mapped as arriving from Ext address. Timestamp 
information is also pre-processed and modified to start at 0 to match simulation clock. 
The processed packet data file has the following structure:  
 Source_addr;Source_port;Dest_addr;Dest_port;Protocol;Payload 
 N1;1036;N5;25;ICMP;A765BC7F54D3AC59… 
Internally-generated packets are forwarded to each source wireless node via GetPacket() 
method by the simulation event handler. The node then routes the packet to the 
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destination using a certain ad hoc wireless routing protocol (e.g., ADSR). For the purpose 
of this simulation, routing protocol is not used; the packet is forwarded by the simulation 
event handler module on each processor to an appropriate receiver node, and the method 
GetPacket() is deprecated. An external packet generator class may also be devised. 
Simulation objects and their properties for this simulation are given in the table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1. Simulation objects for ad hoc wireless network clustering simulation. 
 
Object Properties 
1. Ad hoc 
wireless node 
(wnode) 
1. Mobility: Random Waypoint algorithm 
2. IsClusterHead: Boolean 
3. CommRange: integer – node’s communication range in 
simulation distance units (e.g., meters) 
4. GetPacket(): get next packet method – invoked by the simulation 
framework to pass next source network packet to the wireless 
node from the packet distribution process.  
5. Send(): send packet method 
6. Receive(): receive packet method 
7. ProcessPacket(): IDS packet-monitoring method 
8. PacketQueue: fixed-size incoming-packet buffer (40 packets) 
9. cntReceivedPackets: long integer – total number of received 
packets by that node 
10. cntProcessedPackets: long integer – total number of packets 
processed by IDS packet-monitoring service 
 
The following figure 5.7 shows a simplified activity diagram of Ad Hoc Wireless Node 















Is Packet Buffer 
Full?













 Figure 5.7. Ad hoc wireless node activity diagram. 
 
The wireless node object is implemented as a Java class following the WINDS object 
design template, and has the structure (in pseudo code) depicted in the following listing.  
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// Wireless Node class 
// Object parameters and default parameter values: 
 
//#P str DefaultObjectNamePrefix, int initXPos, int initYPos, bool 
isMobile, int commRange 
 
//#D wNode, 0, 0, true, 800 
 
 
public class wnode { 
 
  int ID; 
 
  String objName; 
 
  simEvtHandler ParentClass; 
 
// IDS & Clustering parameters 
 
  int cntReceivedPackets = 0; 
 
  int cntProcessedPackets = 0; 
 
  queue PacketQueue[40]; 
 
// Other parameters 
 
  boolean IsClusterHead = false; 
 




  wnode() // Wireless node object constructor - initialization 
 
  void Tick() // Simulation clock pulse 
 
  void Receive(Long simClock, String dataType, String strPayload)  
 
  void Send(Long simClock, String dataType, String strPayload) 
 
  void wMove() // Wireless node mobility 
 








5.3.3   Simulation Execution and Results 
The wnode class was placed in the simulation root/objects directory, then 
dynamically loaded by the simulation framework. The packet generation is performed by 
the simulation event handler on each processor (in case of a WINDS distributed 
simulation), or a separate packet processor class (as implemented in the single-processor 
simulation version). Each node then locally receives a packet through the Receive() 
method and processes the IDS lookup via ProcessPacket() method. The results are sent to 
the central Simulation Statistics window of the user interface, and are saved into a CSV 
file for analysis. Upon simulation execution, the following results were obtained. 
 
 
Figure 5.8. Packet-monitoring agent allocation simulation in progress. 
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The simulation results show that as the network density increases, the percentage of 
wireless nodes running packet-monitoring IDS functionality decreases, showing a very 
good scalability of the clustering algorithm (figure 5.5). At the same time, with the 
increase of wireless network density, these packet-monitoring nodes get overloaded with 
the amount of network traffic that needs to be processed, resulting in a large amount of 
packets being excluded from the IDS monitoring process (figure 5.6). The detailed 
explanation of these results has been given in the previous section, and the solution to the 
non-scalability of the packet-monitoring mechanism is presented further in this chapter.  
 
 
5.4   Intrusion Detection Mechanisms 
5.4.1
 
les to determine the threat level more accurately and initiate intrusion response. Such 
   Collaborative vs. Independent Decision Making 
 Experience with intrusion detection systems designed for wired networks helps us to 
classify decision-making mechanisms for such IDS systems into two categories – 
collaborative and independent. The first type of decision-making mechanism is employed 
in systems where each node can take active part in intrusion detection process. An 
example of such a system is given in [86], where a simple majority voting scheme is used, 
in which any node that detects an intrusion with high enough confidence can initiate a 
response. More sophisticated cooperative decision-making schemes use fuzzy logic and
ru
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mechanisms are discussed in [71] and [20]. However, such systems are prone to denial of 
service and spoofed intrusion attacks, where any (malicious) node can trigger full-forced 
intrusion response, affecting entire network.  
 
 In an independent decision-making system, certain nodes are designated to perform 
decision-making functionality. Their task is to obtain intrusion alert information from 
other nodes and to decide with a good accuracy whether or not a node in question 
presents a threat to network security. Other nodes don’t have any influence on the 
decision-making process that concerns a certain node. This category of decision-making 
mechanisms is far less prone to spoofing attacks; however, the amount of information 
obtained by a decision-making node about each node participating in the network is 
limited. If a node in question had failed in local intrusion detection and all reporting 
mechanisms were somehow disabled, it will be difficult to detect such kinds of passive 
intrusion, where, for instance, a node could be intruded into and used as a passive listener 
on the network. 
 
5.4.2   Intrusion Detection Process 
 Our intrusion detection system utilizes a customized independent decision-making 
mechanism. Decision agents are located on the same nodes as packet-monitoring agents. 
Detection and classification of security violations works as follows. Decision agent 
contains a state machine for all the nodes within the cluster it resides in. As intrusion or 
anomalous activity evidence is gathered for each node, the agent can decide with a 
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certain confidence that a node has been compromised by looking at reports from the 
node’s own local monitoring agents, and the packet-monitoring information pertaining to 
that node. There is no need for other neighboring nodes to detect an intrusion or 
anomalies from the node in question, as this will be subject to denial of service (DOS) 
attacks on such a decision scheme. When a certain level of threat is reached for a node in 
uestion, decision agent dispatches a command that an action must be undertaken by the 
local agents on that node, as described in section 5.2. In time, the threat level decreases 
for each node in the decision agent’s database. Decision-making agent maintains a 
q
“sliding-window” view on the intrusion data for each node within its cluster. Repetitive 
alerts of the same type within that window will cause an action to be undertaken by a 
decision agent to secure the breach in a network caused by a certain node or a group of 
nodes. The sliding window technique is necessary to account for certain uses of the 
network node that do not conform to accepted range of normal behavior, yet do not 
represent a threat to the wireless network as such.  
 
 Local anomaly detection models have been developed [86, 71, 20] that can detect an 
intrusion with a great degree of accuracy. According to the surveyed research, two types 
of profiling are made. Some IDS systems maintain a database of possible intrusion 
activity patterns and trigger alarm when such activity is detected. These systems result in 
fewer false alarms due to a variation in node usage patterns; however, intrusion activities 
with new patterns are likely to be underreported. The other category of IDS systems 
maintain a normal operational profile formed by a learning process. Anything that falls 
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outside such a profile of activities is classified as a possible intrusion. These systems 
have a higher false alarm rate, but are more likely to discover unknown intrusion, making 
such a model a choice for our IDS. 
 
5.4.3   CBR Implementation of a Packet-Monitoring Agent 
n specific case, together with a metadata dictionary 
t different case features, such as the required comparator and its value 
type, are stored. This use of a metadata dictionary and the separation of domain specific 
daptive” or “reflective” 
 Packet-monitoring agents were described in the previous sections. Their 
functionality is to screen incoming network packets for known intrusions. This section 
describes the architecture of a case-based reasoner that is built into our packet-monitoring 
agents.  
 
 The generic Case-Based Reasoner (CBR) component assumes no knowledge about 
the application domain regarding case features and their comparison.  The system can be 
tailored into a domain-specific case-based reasoner by defining the data type definition of 
the XML representation of a domai
where the data abou
knowledge from generic components is an example of “a
architecture. Hence the title for our packet-monitoring engine architecture. The advantage 
of this software engineering approach is that the same generic CBR source code can used 
for any application domain – no, or very minimal, additional programming is required. 
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 The case-based reasoning process of an IDS is as follows. A packet is received from 
the network and fed into the CBR module. The packet is converted into an XML 
representation as specified in a corresponding DTD file. The search engine in the CBR 
module searches for similar cases in case archive. In the search process, cases are 
compared to the received packet’s XML representation. For each feature in the packet 
XML data, the CBR module looks in the metadata dictionary for the type of the required 
comparator, and the comparator is created by reflection (i.e., during run time). Each 
comparator determines whether the packet feature matches the corresponding case feature. 
Once all the features are compared, the CBR module assigns a similarity value for the 
compared case. Lastly, the CBR module retrieves the matching case or cases and 
erforms the prescribed action. 
xp_peekqueue possible buffer overflow"; content: 
erence: bugtraq,2040; reference: cve,CAN-2000-
1085; classtype: attempted-user; sid: 697; rev: 3;) 
p
 
 In order to implement a packet-monitoring agent using CBR, we converted the rules 
of the well-known Snort intrusion-detection system into a case archive. All the elements 
in a rule header, as well as the rule options, that are used in the rule matching process by 
Snort are treated as case features, and the rule action and its corresponding rule options 
(such as message element) are treated as the case action. An example of a Snort rule is 
shown below:  
 
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $SQL_SERVERS 139 (msg: "MS-SQL 
"x|00|p|00|_|00|p|00|e|00|e| 00|k|00|q|00|u|00|e|00|u|00|e|00|"; nocase; 
flags: A+; offset: 32; ref
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The attributes in this case are protocol, source and destination IP addresses and ports, and 
packet’s payload that contains a given hex string.  
 
 In the Snort IDS, the corresponding rule action is taken only if all of the elements 
that make up a rule match with the network packet. This means that in the corresponding 
domain-specific CBR system, the similarity metric must be bivalent; in other words, the 
atches must be exact.  Hence there is no need for similarity ranking. Thus, from a CBR 
ble number 
 quite small in size. Moreover, due to its modular design and implementation, both the 
as the core of the packet-monitoring 
gents in the intrusion detection process. 
5.5   Load-Balancing for Packet-Monitoring Agents 
m
standpoint, the corresponding system is quite simple, and accounts for a sizea
of false-positive and false-negative alarms. The entire packet monitoring CBR system, 
including the case archive created from Snort rules, together with required comparators, 
is
reasoner and case archive components are portable. This is very important for network 
agent implementation. This CBR system serves 
a
 
 This section describes distributed load-balancing approach to packet monitoring 
process that reduces the number of unscreened packets and improves the quality of 
intrusion detection process. 
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5.5.1   Load-Balancing Strategies for Network Packet Monitoring 
 This section presents a linear-time solution to the problem of packet-monitoring 
agent overload in the form of distributed online load-balancing algorithm. Our idea of 
load balancing the ad hoc wireless IDS resembles to some extent the techniques applied 
 computing clusters [45, 6]. Generally, a computing cluster consists of nodes connected 
 processes that can be 
assigned to execute efficiently on several members of the cluster in parallel. An optimal 
everal connected 
machines. These clusters provide multitasking time-sharing environment for executing 
sequential jobs on multiple nodes at a time. The situation can become more unpredictable 
than in the case of a cluster computer, as wireless cluster membership changes rapidly 
and traffic patterns cannot be modeled precisely.  Formally, load-balancing problem is 
defined as follows: Given n machines and a sequence of independent jobs arriving at 
defined by its demand vector: 
 
i(j) is the resource demand of job j in a machine i, for a problem of one-resource 
in
by a communication network. Tasks can be split into multiple
assignment of jobs to machines was shown to be NP-hard [24] even when jobs require 
single resource and the demands of this resource are known in advance.  
 
 In an ad hoc network, we divide wireless nodes into clusters of s
random, minimize the maximal resource utilization among all the machines. A job j is 
p(j) = (p1(j), p2(j), …, pn(j)) 
where p
allocation in a cluster of heterogeneous machines. For our intrusion detection system we 
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consider several resources on each node – CPU utilization, available memory and 
bandwidth. The above-mentioned load-balancing problem is then modified to minimize 
the maximal utilization of all the resources on all members of the cluster. As the intrusion 
detection tasks are CPU and memory-intensive processes, each resource carries different 
level of importance. We have adopted the weight ratio of CPU : Memory : Bandwidth as 
5 : 3 : 1. Each node in a cluster then computes its weighted resource index that is then 
compared to the demand vecto la: 
i aaaR       (5.1) 
 
 where for each node i, CPU, Mem and Bandwidth are CPU utilization, memory 
utilization and bandwidth utilization, respectively, and a is a constant so that 1 < a < 2  
[45].  
 
 The sequence of intrusion-processing job assignment to other members of the cluster 
by a CH node is as follows: 
 
• When cluster head (CH) node’s resource index reaches a predefined threshold, it 
prepares for job delegation 
• All nodes within the cluster compute their current snapshot R using equation 5.1 
• CH node partitions the buffer of incoming packets scheduled for intrusion detection 
processing into batches 
r of a given job, using the formu
 
)()()( iBandwidthiMemiCPU ++= 35
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• 
to respective node for intrusion detection 
processing 
• Results are returned back to the CH node’s decision-making agent 
 
 The optimal node selection for the computing cluster job allocation has also been 
studied. One possible strategy is to use a Greedy algorithm. It is an online load-balancing 
algori  jobs to a machine in order to minimize resource 
uti ed 
ma
Greed es [6] is called ASSIGN-U. This algorithm defines a 
no
margi e complexity of this algorithm has been shown to be O(log n) for 
he
section below, resulting in decreased processing due to a load-balancing procedure. 
 
Each batch job is selected to best fit the resource usage index of an optimally-
selected node 
• Each batch of packets is then forwarded 
thm for assignment of new
lization. This algorithm has been shown to have a complexity of O(n) [6] for unrelat
chines. Another online algorithm that was shown to improve the competitive ratio of 
y for unrelated machin
nlinear cost function to assign jobs to machines in such a way as to minimize its 
nal added cost. Th
terogeneous machines. We introduce several optimizations in the implementation 
5.5.2   Optimal Job Assignment and Algorithm Implementation 
 As discussed, we consider three resources for the purpose of packet-monitoring task. 
When packet queue reaches certain threshold in a cluster head node, a message is sent to 
all current members of the cluster, asking for each node’s resource index. Every node 
then forwards its resource index to the CH node. CH node then makes a decision on how 
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to optimally partition the buffer into batches of packets to be dispatched to selected nodes. 
The assignment is done in such a way as to minimize the overall resource usage RU, i.e.: 
 
))35(min( )()()()()()(∑ +++ ++= jBwiBwjMemiMemjCPUiCPU aaaRU   (5.2) , ji
 
r each node i and task j. Overall resource usage is comprised from a sum of marginal 
al case, when there 
are multiple heterogeneous nodes to choose from, each having multiple resources of 
different importance, the formula to compute the marginal cost is: 
 
fo





 is resource utilization of resource k on node i, and bk is the weight of resource k. 
  
 When implementing the load-balancing algorithm in our simulation test-bed, we 
helps us decide on the 
ode’s current resource availability. This resource usage average is then periodically sent 





kkk ababjH )()( )(      (5.3) 
 
where M is a set of available resources, pk is a demand vector of task j on resource k, and
lk
have adapted it to a low-power wireless network scenario and optimized several 
computation-intensive operations, as follows. Each node periodically computes its 
resource index and keeps a running average of recent resource usage, maintaining a 
sliding history window to the node’s overall resource usage. This 
n
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considerably more packets than it can handle (as in the case of a traffic burst), it will 
partition the queue of packets into batches and forward these to the most suitable node, as 
selected by the load-balancing policy.  
 
 One assumption we have maintained is that all the nodes within the cluster are 
homogeneous, and that each node has a 10-packet buffer allocated for IDS packet 
processing. In the simulation framework model, packets that were extracted from a 
network trace file averaged 1kb in size (this was due to MTU settings on the host system 
where packets were collected). Due to nodes being homogeneous, IDS packet-processing 
time is considered the same for all nodes, being an exponential distribution with the mean 
of 100ms. Network link speeds were taken to be 2Mbps (typical numbers for an 802.11b 
network), yielding a transmission time of 10ms, including overhead. This allows us to 
pre-compute each task’s demand vector to be (CPU, Memory, Bandwidth) = (1000ms, 
10240b, 10ms). Therefore, these computations won’t have to be performed every time. 
As shown in [29], the average number of nodes per cluster is 5, for a network of up to 
100 mobile nodes. For the optimal task allocation, cluster head (CH) node maintains a 
square matrix of resources for each cluster member, with each row being a vector of 
resource indices of all cluster members. When need arises, CH computes the Hi values, 
replacing the diagonal of the matrix, then adds each row of the matrix and picks the 
smallest number, with the index of that row indicating the node to which the next batch 
of packets is to be sent to.  This operation is not computationally expensive, as average 
number of nodes per cluster is small. We have reduced the processing cost due to load-
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balancing policy decisions, which is negligible compared to the processing requirements 
of the intrusion detection system. Therefore, there is a real benefit of using the load-
balancing algorithm compared to a one-server approach. 
 
 To model the packet-monitoring situation, we view our model as a queuing system. 
First, we consider original one-server (cluster head) IDS packet-monitoring approach. 
The model in this case is an M/M/1 queuing system with fixed queue length of 10 packets, 
a Poisson packet arrival process, and exponentially-distributed packet-monitoring service 
times with a mean of 100ms per packet. The mean arrival packet rate is varied to 
accommodate several network scenarios, where number of cluster members and 
respective transmission rates are varied. Simulated versus analytical packet drop rates are 
shown in figure 5.9. Next, we consider the load-balancing algorithm applied to our 
intrusion detection system. The model is an M/M/n queuing system with n nodes per 
5.5.3   Simulation vs. Analytical Results 
 packet monitors for the IDS. To further reduce the load due to 
intrusion detection processing on each wireless node, the incoming packet queue size is 
 with simulation test-bed executing ad hoc 
cluster that can act as
also reduced. From our earlier experiments
network clustering algorithm [29], the number of cluster members varies mostly in the 
range from 2 to 8, with an average being 5 nodes per wireless cluster, for an ad hoc 
wireless network with up to 100 mobile nodes scattered over a 4 square-mile area. This is 
depicted in figure 5.10, where results for load balancing approach with varied number of 
cluster members are compared to a one-server per wireless cluster model. 
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Upon implementing the load-balancing strategy, simulation results from our 
simulation framework show that there is a considerable reduction in the number of 
packets dropped from the cluster head node’s intrusion processing buffer, as shown in 
figure 5.11. The graph shows considerably-reduced packet dropping rate as the network 
density increases, indicating good scalability of the DID (distributed intrusion detection) 
strategy, therefore improving the quality of intrusion detection. Using the distributed 
load-balancing algorithm, tasks of intrusion detection are optimally allocated to nodes 
within the cluster so that overall resource usage is minimized.  
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Figure 5.9. Simulated vs. analytical packet drop rate for one server per cluster IDS processing. 
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Figure 5.10. Load-balancing approach packet drop rates for various network configurations. 
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e packet-monitoring node, 
s opposed to a monolithic system, where each wireless broadcast may result in multiple 
odes checking the same packet, and thus wasting computing resources. Secondly, we 
 
The worst-case scenario happens when there is a large amount of traffic on the 
network (see Figure 5.10). When this happens, cluster head node would follow the 
algorithm and pick nodes with least resource usage in sequence. However, as more traffic 
arrives, we may find ourselves in a situation that every node in a cluster performs packet-
monitoring tasks. What would be the advantage of using our load-balancing algorithm 
compared to a monolithic intrusion detection system? There are several feasible 




can regulate the load due to intrusion processing task by varying the quality of intrusion 
detection. That is, the amount of computing required for intrusion detection task on each 
node can be fixed, resulting in availability of processing power of each node for regular 
tasks. Therefore, excessive packets would be dropped from the system, when the network 
traffic increases considerably, thus aiding in a greater intrusion detection system 
scalability. 
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Figure 5.11. Decrease in packet dropping rate when using distributed load-balancing algorithm. 
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5.6   Summary 
With emergence of a wide range of wireless devices, protecting ad-hoc wireless 
networks became an increasingly important but also a more difficult task. Scarce 
computational and power resources of mobile nodes impose heavy limitations on 
functionality of an effective intrusion detection system. Given these limitations, we have 






architecture is aimed to minimize the costs of network monitoring and maintaining a 
monolithic IDS system, also providing a high degree of protection against the intrud
New agents with added functionality can be plugged in when an expansion is necessa
Moreover, based on individual security requirements, the level of monitoring can be 
decreased resulting in greater availability of computational resources for the entire 
network.  
 Case-Based Reasoner [30, 69] has been implemented based on Snort rules that is 
incorporated into packet-monitoring agents and efficiently monitors incoming packets for
known intrusion, checking them against the known database of attacks. The problem
packet-monitoring agent overload has been solved using an online distributed load-
balancing algorithm, resulting in a much more accurate intrusion detection system.  
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CHAPTER 6: PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF PINS, HLA AND 
TSPACES  
 multiprocessor cluster computers.  
• To utilize computationally-intensive back-propagation neural network algorithm 
for implementation using the above distributed technologies. 
 
This chapter describes a comparison study between two commonly-used distributed 
technologies – High Level Architecture, TSpaces, and our PINS simulation framework. A 
computationally-intensive algorithm for back-propagation neural network classifier 
training is implemented and simulated using HLA, TSpaces and PINS. First, we discuss 
these distributed technologies that are commonly used to create parallel and distributed 
systems. We then briefly describe parallel back-propagation neural network training 
algorithm for packet-based intrusion detection systems, which is being simulated in this 
study. Finally, we discuss implementation and performance differences in each of the 
technologies used and in the underlying hardware architectures – uni-processor and 
symmetric
 
6.1   Study Objectives 
• To compare simulation performance of PINS simulation framework with High 
Level Architecture and IBM’s TSpaces Java implementations.  
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6.2   Distr
 With increased complexities of blems we deal with today, the 
processing power of a single computer system became inadequate for certain problems of 
lob
ance ratio for a given 
omputing problem. For many problems it's possible to achieve an order of magnitude 
improvement in price/performance compared with "conventional" parallel supercomputer 
 used in this section as a hardware platform for comparing 
dist u





ibuted System Architectures – HLA and TSpaces 
computing pro
g al scale; and use of super-computer wasn’t always an option for many researchers. 
With the advent of computer networks and later on - computing clusters, the field of 
parallel and distributed computing has received a widespread recognition. Beowulf 
cluster implementation has raised parallel and distributed computing to a new level. 
Cluster computers were first introduced in 1994 as a result of the Beowulf Project at 
CESDIS. A Beowulf system is a collection of personal computers constructed from 
commodity-off-the-shelf hardware components interconnected with a local-area network 
and configured to operate as a single unit, a parallel computing platform, using an open-
source network operating system (e.g., Linux) [8]. The driving design philosophy of a 
Beowulf system is to achieve the best possible price/perform
c
designs. Cluster computing is
rib ted computing technologies – Defense Modeling and Simulation Office (DMSO) 
evel Architecture/Run-Time Infrastructure, IBM’s TSpaces
ulation framework – as implementation platforms for the back-propagation neural 
k training algorithm.  
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One of the most recent developments in distributed simulation technologies is the 
High Level Architecture (HLA/RTI), driven by DARPA, which has become a 
standardized framework (IEEE 1516) for modeling and simulation. It has been introduced 
in this dissertation in section 2.1.3. HLA is a component-based software architecture that 
incorporates subsystems for communication and data sharing, synchronization, and time 
management [59]. This framework facilitates distributed and multi-platform computing 
by providing standard integration architecture for separate and remote applications, thus 
facilitating reuse of components. HLA provides specifications for seamless integration of 
various simulation components; however, the efficiency of the entire simulation heavily 
depends on implementation and operational performance of each individual simulator 
comprising the simulation. At the network level, RTI utilizes reliable multicast protocols 
to implement inter-federate data exchange.   
 
IBM’s TupleSpaces (TSpaces) is a set of network communication buffers called 
tuple spaces and a set of APIs for accessing those buffers [85]. TSpaces allows 
heterogeneous, Java-enabled devices to exchange data with little programming effort. 
The package includes server software that implements the buffers and client software for 
accessing the buffers. The TSpaces server is composed of two main layers. The bottom 
layer comprises the basic tuple management. This is where tuple sets are stored, updated, 
indexed, and scanned. The interface to this layer is the Tuple Management API. The top 
layer comprises the operator component, which is responsible for operator registration 
and handling, implementation, and management. TSpaces provides group communication 
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servi
6.3   Knowledge Discovery Problem for Intrusion Detection 
havior [49]. Neural network techniques may 
e found to be more efficient and less computationally intensive than conventional rule-
base
ces, database services, URL-based file transfer services, and event notification 
services. With its small footprint, it is ideal for bringing network services to small and 
embedded systems. TSpaces emulates a shared-memory multiprocessor architecture and 
reduces the complexity of writing parallel programs accessing shared data. This comes at 
the expense of message-passing performance, especially in the cluster computer 
environment, where the data is not physically shared among the processors. 
 
Neural networks offer alternative means of maintaining a model of expected normal 
user behavior. They offer a more efficient, less complex, and better performing model 
than statistical models of system and user be
b
d systems. A lengthy, careful training phase is required with skilled monitoring. 
After the training period, the network tries to match actual commands with the actual user 
profile already present in the net. Any incorrectly predicted events actually measure the 
deviation of the user from the established profile. 
 
The problem of data mining within large datasets places high demand on 
computational resources. This makes it a viable problem to measure the performance of a 
distributed system. Specific application of it is considered in our comparison study – a 
back-propagation neural network training algorithm for an intrusion detection system 
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(BPNN). Given a large initial training data file, the intrusion detector learning task is to 
build a predictive model (i.e. a classifier) capable of distinguishing between ”bad” 
connections, called intrusions or attacks, and “good” normal connections. A standard set 
of data to be audited, which includes a wide variety of intrusions simulated in a military 
network environment, was provided by Lincoln Labs [32] in the form of a network trace 
file incorporating known labeled attacks. A connection is a sequence of TCP packets 
starting and ending at some well defined times, between which data flows to and from a 
source IP address to a target IP address under some well defined protocol.  Each 
connection is labeled as either normal, or as an attack, with exactly one specific attack 
type 
eural network training algorithms and 




The training process proceeds as follows. A finite dataset [50] of 2,000,000 records 
is partitioned equally among N processors. Each processor is an independent self-
contained computer that is part of a computing cluster (further referred to as a Node). 
One node is designated as a Master and is responsible for task allocation and result 
unification; while other nodes are designated Workers for the back-propagation neural 
network. BPNN [83] is one of the widely used n
iques have been introduced for BPNN [49, 47, 76]. Our choice for a cluster 
computer is a training method based upon set partitioning and epoch-based weights 
update schemes. This allows us to reduce the amount of inter-processor communication 
needed to distribute data, which is beneficial for a cluster computer environment with a 
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relatively slow inter-communication links. BPNN is trained iteratively, until an 
acceptable mean square error rate is achieved. At the beginning of each iteration (called 
epoch), master process creates a series of task requests and forwards them to the workers 
via a communication technology of choice. Each request contains information on a 
fraction of the entire dataset to be processed. Worker processes work on the 
corresponding fractions of the dataset and communicate results back to the master. 
Master process then aggregates all partial results. Once data mining step is complete, the 
quality of training result is evaluated. Algorithm follows certain steps to determine its 
error and propagate it back to modify the connection patterns of its hidden layers. The 
error value of the output unit j is:  
))(1( jjjjj ataae −−=        (6.1) 
The adjustment of the connection weights between unit i and unit j occurs using the 
equation: 
ijji aerweight ∗∗=∆ −        (6.2) 







where r is the learning rate of the network, ej is the calculated error value, tj 
represents the target output, and ai represents the activation level of sigmoid function at 
the unit. The new value of a connection is an addition of the old weight value, and the 
change in weight. 
∗−−        (6.3) 
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Quality is measured by the classification rate with regard to the training dataset and 
the new testing dataset, instances of which were not part of the training dataset. Usually, 
good classification rate on the training dataset is regarded important; but good results on 
a testing dataset are also significant, as they imply that the data mining process was able 
to extract knowledge that represents not only the patterns in the training dataset, but also 
those of unseen patterns. For the purpose of this study, the testing dataset was not used. 
 
The BPNN parallel neural network classifier problem for intrusion detection was 
implemented using several distributed communication technologies – High Level 
Architecture/RTI, PINS framework and TS ster 
fect of using a symmetric-multiprocessor cluster configuration for processor-
intensive tasks with operating system-directed task allocation. These clusters had the 
following configurations. Cluster 1 (Scerola) has 128 nodes with single 900 MHz AMD 
interconnected via Fast Ethernet network. 
Cluster 2 (Ariel) has dual Pentium-4 2.6GHz processor configuration on each of its 32 
nodes, managed by SUN Solaris OS (only 16 were used for performance comparison), 
and i
paces. Hardware platform used was a clu
computer with 16 individual nodes. Two clusters were involved in this experiment to 
detect the ef
Athlon processors, running Linux Red Hat, and 
nterconnected via Gigabit Ethernet network links.  
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6.4   Simulation Design 
HLA/RTI implementation involved defining user interaction classes and devising 
communication strategy among federates. First, the Worker federates were started, that 
would join RTI federation execution, publish and subscribe to interaction classes and 
partition the training file. Then each Worker waits for a work order from a Master 
process, and upon receipt, computes BPNN weights. After sending results back to the 
Master, the Worker awaits further work orders in an infinite loop. The Master process 
retrieves initial weights, allocates portions of work order to each Worker process, then 
sends out work orders and awaits results. When all the individual results have been 
received and combined, an error is computed. If within the threshold (0.01 percentile), 
the result is accepted and Master displays total run-time. Otherwise, a new set of work 
orders is distributed among the Workers. The total work order is divided in a way that 
each worker receives equal part of the training file for processing, since the program is 
executed in a homogeneous parallel environment with all nodes having approximately 
equivalent system resources.  
 
The TSpaces implementation differs from the RTI implementation in that the Master 
doesn’t communicate with a specific Worker process, but rather places a work order in a 
virtual shared memory. Since task processing time of Worker process is much larger than 
network communication time, and having the number of Workers equal to the number of 
work orders, the problem is evenly distributed among available processors. The 




Class Worker { 
 
 Connect to RTI; 
 Create / Join Federation Execution; 
 Publish / Subscribe to Interaction Classes; 
 Retrieve Training Data; 
 
   Loop { 
  Receive Work Order; 
  De-serialize Parameters; 
  Build / Verify Work Order Set; 
  Compute BPNN Weights; 
  Serialize Parameters; 
  Send Result to Master; 









Listing 6.1. BPNN Worker Class Algorithm. 
Class Master { 
 
Connect to RTI; 
Create / Join Federation Execution; 
 Publish / Subscribe to Interaction Classes; 
 Read Initial Weights; 
 Get Start Time; 
  
  Loop { 
     Compute New BPNN Weights { 
   Send Out Work Orders to Workers; 
   Receive All Results; 
     }  
  Test Result { 
   If Result Successful, Display Running Time and Quit; 
   Else Continue; 
  } 




Listing 6.2. BPNN Master Class Algorithm. 
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The difference in implementation using RTI and TSpaces libraries is in Send and 
Receive methods. While RTI publishes interaction and transmits message via multicast to 
all f plementation puts a data tuple into virtual shared memory and 
noti aling or polling). Each client 
then picks up a tuple from tuple space, effectively removing it from shared memory. 
Sinc ay to specify a particular processor to send 
data ly scan for data that matches specific template. 
 
e PINS implementation differs from HLA/RTI implementation only in 
ete een the worker and the 
aster processes. RTI provides template for data communications by declaring parameter 
pe t design time, and adding those parameter values in the parameter list prior to each 
communication. Then, the communication interaction is performed by broadcasting 
para n and parses it to find out if 
this at particular process. PINS implementation uses master 
and ilt-in communication broker mechanism. 
Eve lass, only the intended recipient 
actually receives the communication, and no additional processing is performed.  
 
ederates, TSpaces im
fies all clients that data is available for pickup (via sign
e there is no addressing scheme and no w
 to e tuple space clients continu, th ous
 
Th
communication param rs of Send() and Receive() methods betw
m
ty s a
meter list. Each worker process receives the interactio
interaction is addressed to th
worker classes that communicate via bu






// BPNN Worker class 
// Object parameters and default parameter values: 
 
//#P int numNodes, int myID 
//#D 4, 1  
 
public class Worker { 
 
  int ID; 
 
  String objName; 
 
  simEvtHandler ParentClass; 
 
// BPNN algorithm parameters 
 
  int p_orderID; 
 
  Vector p_currentSet; 
 
  String p_hxILines[]; 
 




  Worker() // BPNN Worker object constructor – initialize, load  
           // data file portion 
 
  void Tick() // Simulation clock pulse – not used 
 
  void Receive(Long simClock, String dataType, String strPayload)  
 
  void Send(Long simClock, String dataType, String strPayload) 
 
  void getNextJob() // Receive work order from Master 
 
  void buildSet() // Build BPNN weights set based on work order 
 
  void verifySet() // Verify BPNN weights set based on work order 
 










// BPNN Master class 
// Object parameters and default parameter values: 
 
//#P int numNodes, int myID 
//#D 4, 0  
 
public class Worker { 
 
  int ID; 
 
  String objName; 
 
  simEvtHandler ParentClass; 
 
// BPNN algorithm parameters 
 
  int p_orderID; 
 
  Double p_orderSum; 
 
  String p_hxILines[]; 
 




  Worker() // BPNN Worker object constructor – initialize, load  
           // data file portion 
 
  void Tick() // Simulation clock pulse – not used 
 
  void Receive(Long simClock, String dataType, String strPayload)  
 
  void Send(Long simClock, String dataType, String strPayload) 
 
  void train() // Start training session for current epoch 
 
  void distributeOrder() // Send out work orders to workers 
 
  void buildDistributionSet() // Partition training file among workers 
 






Listing 6.4. BPNN Master Class. 
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While it was possible to create PINS implementation that multiplexes BPNN parameters 
separate consecutive messages were used to send different 
d 6.4 outline the class structure of worker and master 
y PINS implementation of the BPNN training algorithm. Listing 6.1 above 
uence of events for the worker object. 
into one communication, 


























Figure 6.1. Parallel BPNN pro paces and PINS (WINDS). 
 
 
gram execution times for HLA, TS
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6.5   Simulation Execution and Results 
Simulation was executed for each implementation on an identical training data set. 
The results of running these implementations on a varied number of cluster nodes are 
plotted in figure 6.1.  
 
Even though the HLA implementation required considerably more effort from 
software engineering perspective, the results show a considerable overall decrease in the 
total execution time compared to TSpaces, attributed to faster inter-node communications. 
The performance of PINS implementation is slightly better than that of a High Level 
Architecture – this is the case for both uni-processor and symmetric multiprocessor 
underlying hardware architectures. Implementation of PINS using WINDS framework 
involved less effort than HLA, and comparable to TSpaces, making it a viable choice for 
solving parallel and distributed systems problems. The performance of TSpaces is better 
than any other distributed technology in the case of only one worker. This may be 
attributed to the internal optimizations of TSpaces API implementation, detecting local 
communication and using direct method access. As far as the overall expense of the 
distributed system solution goes, the total processor time (on all nodes) plus inter-node 
communication demonstrates an added overhead of a distributed system. For instance, 
using RTI with one worker yields 2129 processor-seconds execution time (total time for 
problem solution by all processors, including idle time during wait, since we used a 
de e 
to 3267 processor-seconds per problem. In situations where the processor time is an 
dicated cluster with no foreign processes). Using 16 processors increases the total tim
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expensive resource, a careful cost analysis and planning has to be performed prior to 
implementing the distributed system.  
 
Examining performances of both HLA/RTI and PINS Java implementations on a 
single-processor and symmetric multi-processor cluster computers, we infer that Java 
Virtual Machine efficiently utilizes dual-processor configuration and dramatically speeds 
up computationally-intensive tasks without further modeling by the researcher. This 
demonstrates cost-effectiveness of using a multi-processor cluster configuration, since 
processing time is considerably reduced for the same-size task, compared to single-
processor cluster configuration. In our tests of BPNN algorithm on all 32 nodes of Ariel 
cluster, the execution would occasionally deadlock when running HLA implementation. 
This is due to very small processing times on the client processors, resulting in increased 
utilization of communication channel. As the number of processors increases in a parallel 
system, problem implementation has to be planned and evaluated carefully to avoid 
deadlock problems, as network communication becomes the bottleneck. 
 
In this chapter we have presented comparison of implementations of an intrusion 
detection-class data mining problem using various distributed technologies and 
concluded that WINDS offers better performance for certain distributed problems than 
comparable HLA and TSpaces implementations.  
6.6   Summary 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION  
 
 
rs to reduce the 
mount of network traffic required for the simulation execution. This is achieved by 
serializing simulation objects and transporting them to the optimal destination processor. 
While this introduces an overhead in simulation control, for certain simulated problems it 
has p
The result of our research and development effort in the area of distributed 
simulation systems for wireless networks is PINS – an interactive, scalable, cross-
platform parallel/distributed simulation system for computer networks. The PINS 
architecture is a scalable multi-processor simulation framework that can be used in 
tightly-coupled symmetric multiprocessor cluster computer environments, as well as in 
distributed networked systems (e.g., LANs). The object-oriented nature of the PINS 
architecture makes it possible to design distributed simulations and obtain results in a 
short time. A simulation clock synchronization mechanism is incorporated, that enables 
the framework to execute simulation events and commands simultaneously on all 
processors. Several parallel-system-oriented optimizations have been incorporated into 
the design of the PINS architecture. For instance, nodes with large inter-node 
communication requirements can be grouped on corresponding processo
a
roven to be a worthwhile strategy. A large network traffic dataset from the Lincoln 
Labs studies has been used to test the scalability of the distributed simulation framework 
running the simulation of intrusion detection system for wireless networks. The WINDS 
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simulation framework, based on PINS architecture, was developed to assist us in research 
on wireless network technol
 
each node participating in a distributed simulation, and automatically adjust the 
ogies and applications.  
One such application is the intrusion detection system targeting ad hoc wireless 
networks. This IDS system was designed with the low-resource, high-mobility nature of 
mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) in mind, featuring lightweight IDS components in 
the form of intelligent mobile agents. One aspect of our IDS system was thoroughly 
researched and implemented: the network packet-monitoring module, which captures 
network packets and analyzes them for known attempted intrusions. This component is 
based on a Case-Based Reasoner engine, and relies on a SNORT library of known 
intrusions. Due to low resource availability and low power of nodes comprising wireless 
ad hoc networks, our intrusion detection system was optimized to reduce the processing 
load due to intrusion monitoring on each node in a wireless network. A load balancing 
strategy is applied to distribute the amount of processing required by the IDS among 
several neighboring nodes, thus improving the quality of intrusion detection and reducing 
the load on individual nodes. These techniques were simulated using the WINDS 
framework. Since WINDS targets distributed computers of various configurations and 
network communication latencies, an intelligent algorithm is necessary to automatically 
adjust the distributed simulation clock to eliminate out-of-order delivery and processing 
of simulation events. We have incorporated a resource-monitoring module into our 
distributed simulation network to monitor network conditions and the performance of 
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simulation flow to reflect dynamic changes in the simulation hardware environment.  
Simulation results from a variety of parallel-simulated algorithms show that PINS is a 
onsiderable improvement over a single-processor simulation execution in terms of 
scala
c
bility and speed of simulation execution for large network simulations. We have 
used a resource-demanding computational BPNN algorithm to compare the performance 
of our distributed simulation framework with current standards in distributed simulation 
systems, such as High Level Architecture and Tuple-Spaces.  
 
Currently, the PINS architecture is used to study routing protocols for sensor 
wireless networks. Simulation objects relating to sensor networks will be added to the 
framework library. In the future, many simulation objects may be added, such as a MAC 
access control object, radio propagation and signal path loss models for wireless 
networks, etc.  The PINS framework will also be used in studies of security protocols for 
wireless networks. Future work in intrusion detection for wireless networks may involve 
research into more robust and intelligent cooperative detection algorithms, as well as a 
choice of an anomaly detection model most appropriate for our IDS system. Although we 
have achieved a high level of detection of known intrusions, SNORT rules still give rise 
to a fairly high number of false-positive alerts. Data-mining techniques may be employed 
to reduce the amount of false-positive alerts and to further improve the accuracy of our 
intrusion detection system. Whereas an IDS system may detect attacks on mobile hosts, 
another possibility is to attack the IDS system itself. As our system employs mobile 
agents for intrusion detection, these mobile agents may be the primary target of an attack. 
 143
Possible attacks on our IDS system infrastructure and on individual mobile agents in 
particular may be investigated, and research conducted into effective means of defense 
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